- The objective may be that of ambusining the advance guards, the rear guards or annihilating the whole column. After deciding on the objective, plans are made on the position for concealment, the strongth and deployment of various units such as the main force, the protective force, the weaking force, etc.
- e. Before the ambush, the duties, tactics and significance of the operation should be explained to the troops. "Pep talks" should also be given to stimulate the fighting spirit of the troops.
- f. In operations by small units, troops should arrive at the vicinity of the ambush area before sun down and then proceed to the ambush points after dark to avoid being noticed by local people and travelers. If it is necessary to get to the ambush points during the day, use ravines and wooded roads for the advance. Detain all travelers who know the operation.

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g. Spread propaganda among the people living in the vicinity of the ambush area. Use all methods and procedures to safeguard information and keep the guerrilla operations a secret. When necessary, send out some troops to guard all important road entrances and cut off traffic of the whole area during the night provious to the ambush. Detain all travelers leaving the area and post night guards until the completion of the ambush.

h. To insure a quick and successful ambush operation, all troops should maintain silence in their concealed positions, have unyielding determination, and calmuss. The most important aspect is not to reveal our plan and position by noise, smoke, accidental discharge of weapons etc. Discipling on these matters must be rigidly enforced.

- i. After sighting the enemy, maintain steadiness and withhold fire until the appropriate moment. Premature firing would not only reveal our position but would jeopardize the success of the ambush. It is the most dangerous pitfall the guerrillas may fall into.
- 2. "Cutting-up" attack tactics
 - a. Head on Attack

The tactics of concealing the troops along the route of enemy advance and striking the head of the enemy column is called head-on attack. Under such attack the advance guards of the enemy will become confused and would slow down; if they can be pinned down, they will not be able to report back to their main unit.

Such tactics require a minimum number of troops and some good weapons (light and heavy machine guns). Troops are deployed on

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high ground or on cliff along the routes which are kept under cross fire.

These tactics would also help to destroy the good morale of the enemy, foil their plans, kill their soldiers or force them to reveal their exact strength.

Guerrillas should send out scouts and observers from the base in all directions or train the people to report on enemy troops movements. Head-on attacks should be prepared and conducted at a distance from our base of about two to three days march to the base.

For good results, guerrillas should allow the patrols and observers of the enemy column to pass and then attack the rear of the protective troops or the main unit when it approachs. Machine guns should be directed at the rear of the protective units and at the front of the main force. It is possible for a group of guerrillas with one or two well manned machine guns to destroy several hundred of the enemy. Our lesses would be very small. Even if the raid proved to be a failure, our withdrawal would not be difficult.

b. "Cutting-up" the Rear

When the enemy is shifting great numbers of troops and our guerrilla forces is comparatively too small to launch a full scale ambush, a "cutting-up" attack on the rear of enemy column may be resorted to. The guerrilla forces are deployed along the route in front of bridges or narrow defiles and attack the enemy's rear units before they cross the bridges or defiles. With the defiles occupied, the main force and the rear column /of the enemy/ are unable to assist each other. Communica

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In attacking the rear units of a column, precaution should be taken not to occupy the attacking point during the main enemy advances. This is taken to avoid detection by enemy patrols and observers. In implementing these tactics, guerrillas should conceal themselves from three to five 11 away from the attacking points. Only after the enemy patrols have passed should they quietly move in and deploy at the points of attack. The attacks should be simultaneous from all points in order to confuse the enemy. Sustained attacks on the rear should be carried on. The enemy's power to resist would be weakened considerably if their rear were suddenly cut off and attacked.

c. Mobile "Gutting-up" Attack

Mobile attack is a sudden and rapid attack on the enemy column from a distant point. If culvinates in a direct charge into the enemy column.

This type of tactics is used on roads which are frequently travelled by the enemy and consequently ruin the chance for ambush proparation. The roads may have been constantly under surveillance by enemy observers and patrols. The area may be infected with collaborationists because of the heavy population. The terrain is such that there is no safe concealment point. The of the above reasons would favor this type of tactics. If such an attack develops into our enemy route, we should pursue and exploit the situation to our advantage.

The initial preparation for such an attack is to choose a triangluar point where roads cross. As soon as the enemy's advance forces approaches that point we should dispatch units from

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the other road and ambush them at that crossing. Units engaging in such tactics should be the clite guerrillas, lightly armed, capable of extended forced marches and commanded by astute officers. The mobile "cutting-up" attack requires the highest standards in ambush attack. It is comparable to surprise attack whose success is usually assured.

Guerrillas may advance to the chosen position after the passing of enemy patrols in order to avoid detection. The troops may separately gather and conecal themselves in wooded areas or in tree tops, or disguise themselves as farm hands or woodemen carrying on their works. They should hide their weapons to avoid detection.

d. Separated "Cutting-up" attacks

The following are the conditions for a separated "cutting-up" attacks: when the enemy strength is large or their columns long; when there is no narrow pass on the road for exploiting and our forces are adequate. This type of tactics consists of ambushing the enemy on the road from two or more separate points. The greater the number of ambushes and attacks the better the success will be. The units that launch the first attack may quickly be transferred to another point on the route and carry out another ambush and attack. The separate ambush and attack tactics may be used on long columns of troops passing through a defile or on other dangerous terrain along the road. The aim is to cut the column into many sections and use various tactical means to destroying them.

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Each attack should be based on the principle of striking either the head or the rear of a section. The first and the last attack should be the strongest in order to keep a relentless pressure on the retreating energy.

e. To Lure the Anemy Out and Attack

when the enemy strength is small or when they are engaged only on occupation duty and are consequently not ancious to fight, we should have them out and then attack them. Inducements are many, such as opreading rumors, to arouse their anger; to stander them; to provoke them; to act weak; to run away; to feint and display power; to set fire and shoot and to hit and run. —If these actions are conducted with a very small number of guerrillas in order to have the enemy into chasing and attacking them. We should conceal our main forces at a suitable point and ambush the pursuing enemies.

A small unit of guerrillas deliberately operating openly in the vicinity of the enemy occupied area would frequently encounter enemy pursuit. The frequent pursuits would intensify the enemy's desire to annihilate the small guerrilla units. In one of the pursuits other guerrillas may concentrate all their force near the route and ambush the enemy unexpectedly.

Frequently when the enomy at one place is being attacked, forces from other areas will with that premise, the guerrillas may deploy a large force on the road between the two points and embush the rescue column while conducting a feint attack on the other enemy.

enemy lines, the enemy because of their overwhelming force would attempt to surround the guerrillas. Under that condition the guerrillas may conceal their main strength and allow a small group to lure the enemy into pursuit. In the meantime the main forces, in cooperation with other guerrilla units would quietly deploy themselves on the route of the enemy advance for ambushing and attacking the enemy.

3. Deployment of "Cutting-up" Attack

The deployment should take into consideration reliable intelligence on the type of targets, the time needed for the march, the problems of transporting assumition and supplies, etc., before destroying important enemy communication lines or erecting obstacles to stop the enemy advance. The deployment of troops are as follows:

a. Protective Troops

Make reconnaissance on the terrain of roads that guerrillas may use to lead them to the combat area. Occupy the vicinity of enemy transportation line in order to keep on the lock-out for the arrival of enemy or rescuse units.

b. Striking Force

This is the main attacking force. Its duties are to occupy at some point both sides of the road and strike at the enemy when time comes.

c. Wrocking Troops

After a successful attack, these troops should capture and disarm the enemy and remove all essential military goods.

They should destroy or set fire to all communications equipments

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that can not be moved. They should also destroy all roads that may ald the advance or retreat of the enemy.

4. Objectives of "Cutting-up" Reids

Attacking enemy communication lines is easy and is the most profitable objectives in guerrilla warfare. The destruction of enemy communications lines would not only step the continuous flow of essential military susplies to the front, but also help to create a burden on the storage facilities of enemy depots.

There are numerous means for transporting military supplies in an highly developed communication system. The type of communications which should attack may be divided as follows: trains, stomaships, sail ships, notor trucks, or elder types such as ex-certs, mule trains, hand carts, coolies, camels, etc.

The objectives, the capabilities, the equipment, terrain, climate and tactics used are different for different types of transportation. Detailed description will be given in the following chapter under "Specialized Guerrilla harfare".

5. Deployment used Against Rescuing Units.

When and if enemy units whether compat, quartermaster or transportation are warned of an impending attack, other combat units stationed in the vicinity will rush to their rescue. Guorrilla commanders should haston to head off their attempt. After determining the strength and capability of the enemy, the guerrillas may either withdraw quickly or try to fight the enemy rescue column.

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The above various tacties may be used to combat the enemy, if the decision is to fight. If withdrawal is in order, all captured but burdensome enemy supplies should be destroyed and the withdrawal made as quickly as possible.

6. Movement After the "Cutting-up" Attack

Movement after the "cutting-up" attack is similar to movement after the frontal attack, except that before a "cutting-up" attack is launched, the enemy is on the retreat because of the losses suffered through the initial ambush. Such splendid opportunity should be utilized in sustaining a pursuing attack and inflicting more casualties.

Prequently, because of the lack of adequate training, the pursuing guerrillas waste much time in search for abandoned enemy weapons, equipment or possession of enemy prisoners of war, instead of dischanging their important duty of pursuit. Such conduct should be corrected by disciplinary action. The pursuing tactics is not that of direct pursuit but of winding and fimil: attack to increase the area of combat.

C. Riots and Disturbances

Riots and disturbances are one of the guerrilla tactics used inside enemy territory. The objective is to create a favorable condition for our surprise and "cutting-up" attack and to widen the area of warfare. It's secondary aim is to create confusion, fear and insecurity inside the enemy lines.

The guerrillas try to mobilize the people, especially the city dwellers and workers to instigate riot and disturbance in order to overthrow the rules, enemy, and puppet control.

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1. Responsibility in Creating Riot

After secretly infiltrating into enemy territory and spreading patriotic feeling among the people, the guerrillas may start instigating riots. The sims and duties are:

a. To Acquire Weapons

Meapons and military supplies are very essential to the sucrrillas and armed rictors. The primary duty in the early riots is to acquire meapons and supplies. With that the riot movement may espend, people's querrillae may be organized and the area of activities may be increased.

b. Resist Thomy Orders

In enemy or puppet administrated areas, encourage people to resist all regulations, taxes, duties, rents, land rents, etc.

c. Incite Disturbances

Pesides the above riots mentioned, disturbances such as rumors, work stoppages, market strikes, strikes by students, arson, murder, atc. may be used to disrupt all social and political order. This would disturb the peace and quiet of the puppets and collaborationists and gradually wear down their strength.

d. Destroy All Puppets

Puppets are political tools of the enemy in their administration. They are the public enemy of the people.

At the start of airiot, besides occupying important administrative buildings and destroying their functions, all puppets, collaborationists, traitors and their families should be

apprehended and punished. Others who are under protection from the enony may be secretly assassinated.

2. Time for Miots:

- a. When the people possess high morals and a fighting determination. When people are able to give help from the inside.
- b. When there is conflict between the puppets and the enemy. When there is a revolt by the collaborationists.
- c. When there is a basic guerrilla station in the vicinity which is able to assist at a moment's notice.
- d. When enemy security forces are weak and their police careless.
- e. When large quantities of military supplies are available for capture or destruction.
- \mathbf{r}_{\bullet} , when the enemy's main fronts are critical and the local troops are busy.
- g_{\bullet} When the patience and temper of local people are texed to the limit by enous oppression.

3. Riot tactics

All guerrilla operations should give important consideration to political work and propagenda in soliciting sympathetic help from the people. The most secret and most forceful propaganda should be used to incite and inspire riot inside enemy or puppet territory. Agitation depending on swaying of emotion and appealing to ideals is the spiritual weapon in guerrilla werfare. It is the most significant military factor.

a. Agitation and Deception

Agitation is further divided, depending on the tactic and objective, such as incitement of our people, deception of the enemy and division of the enemy.

(1) Agitation

In the enemy rear, try to appeal to people's emotion and inspire patriotism to cause revolt in the purpet army. Destroy collaborationists and agitate the people into armed action by pointing out to them the various changes imposed on their daily life after the occupation. After being organized, the masses are ready at the right moment to commence an armed riot. In an riot, the higher the number of participants the better it is. The weapons need not be too adequate. Swords or pitch forks may be used. Instructions on the use of firearms and grenades should be given prior to the armed riot to counteract the lack of military knowledge among the peasants.

(2) Deception

political confusion in their country, the expansion of power among the peace-loving countries, the anti-war attitude, the inequality of the people and ranks and the accounts of our various victories. Propaganda among the puppet troops should stress racialism, their lack of freedom, the proverty of their family, the hopelessness in their fight, and the various oppressions imposed on them by the Japanese Army

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in this text. The contents of propaganda should create regrets and motivate them into turning their guns against the enemy.

(3) Divide the Puppet and Enemy

Fabricate a secret report to the effect that certain puppet personnel are working with the guerrillas or our army and allow the enemy to obtain the secret report. Such scheme may cause the execution of those certain puppets.

Disseminate rumors that a certain callaborationist had reformed and is appointed the commander of sertain guerrilla unit - or that a certain pupper commander is being liquidated by the enemy. The aim is to create distruct and confusion between the enemy and the pupper.

(b) Propagunda and Speech

(1) Secret Propaganda

Secrecy is used in promoting propaganda in enemy occupied zones. In reality, political workers of basic guerrilla units are sent out to the occupied area. They are disguised as various tradesmen who must contact the people or the puppet soldiers. During the individual conversation, the guerrilla would disseminate their propaganda with vigor and conviction.

This type of conversational and secret propaganda bring faster results than the open forum type in agitation works. It definitely would give a more lasting impression on the individual than any other form.

Secretly printed propaganda materials may be sent by mail or distributed as hand bills to frighten the enemy. Printed matter may be used to instruct the people in guerrilla and espionage

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work and for appealing to prostitutes to use their arts in securing vital information from the enemy or puppet troops.

Thus slowly and insidiously the effect of propagands are being spread.

(2) Public Speeches

During or after a successful agitation when many people are assembled in one spot to hear a propaganda speech, precautions should be taken for their security. The speeches should be inspiring, sealous confeige, and delivered in loud voices. The listeners after hearing the speeches are aroused to feverish group actions and riots.

Open speeches ma also be used on the enemy if they are near our line in combat. Calling of slogans in the appropriate dialects toward the enemy or puppet troops helps to accelerate the enemy's surrender. The slogan may be: "We will not kill those who hand over their weapons", "We do not kill Japanese enlisted men", "Good treatment for the Prisoner of war", "Our enemy is really the Japanese Military" etc. The calling for surrender may be conducted by enemy or puppet prisoners for better results. During night fighting, enemy or puppet love songs may be sung to create a feeling of homesickness and loneliness among the enemy for their love ones. All these are aiming to nullify their fighting strength.

c. Goordinated Attacks From Both Within and Without

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"Response" attack from inside and outside is the most effective instrument of the riot tactics. During the 1911 revolution, many methods were used to implement this tactic of response attack. Wedding and funeral processions were used as occasions to transport weapons and men secretly into the city as a preparation for response from inside. Manchu troops who were sympathetic to the revolutionary movement inside the city responded and coordinated with the attack from outside. There were many victories.

The response attack conducted by the guerrillas is not confined to armed riot alone. Frequently agents are sent to puppet agencies to commive with some workers to carry on anti-puppet works. Sasic querrillas may be sent behind enough lines and give response to our external attack. This type of tactics, if conducted skillfully, brings about great results.

(1) From External to Internal

The internal response troops should infiltrate into an enemy occupied town or city, deploy secretly and then respond with arm riot when faces from the outside launch the main attack. The concealed troops inside may indicate the enemy's weak points to the forces from the outside for swift attacks. In the meantime, the internal response force would endeavor to open city gates and roads to assist the advance of the main units from the outside.

The internal response force is responsible for guiding the advance of the outside-force, following the prearranged plan for regrouping, determining the route of pursuit, and pointing out where to contact the enemy. All should be carried out swiftly

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to expand the offensive pattern.

(2) From internal to external

The already infiltrated troops inside enemy towns or cities may instigate arm riot before the attack from outside is launched. Such methods however, is very unprofitable. After the infiltration, guerrillas should pay special attention to enemy defenses inside, to the rivalry between the enemy and the puppet, to the discontent eneng the calloborationist camp, and should devise means to further divide them. At the same time, they should try to provide accurity for own movements, keep all plans secret, and secure sympathetic cooperation from the people for safeguarding our intentions. People should be readied by the guerrillas to fight for their liberty and security at a moment's notice. Their works of profiding inside response is of far reaching importance.

method is the reverse of the other method. The guerrillas inside the city direct the outside forces to the attack while the enemy is unaware. A small force may start a riot by setting fire or discharging rifles to attract the main force of the enemy.

After that our main strength from the outside may proceed to attack the main enemy installations or rush to homes or offices where key enemy personnel congregate. Under this condition, even a numerically superior enemy would be divided or scattered, fearful and confused by the swiden attack. They are doomed to defeat.

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The occupation and police force are the main elements that would fight the rioters. Therefore the guerrilla should endeavor to discum or destroy them during the opening stage of the riot.

d. Coordinated Disturbance

It is vary difficult to infiltrate large numbers of people into well guarded and important towns or cities. In that case some especially trained espionage agents are sent deep into enemy occupied city to not first secretly. They also carry out whit and run" attacks on important enemy or puppet personnels.

All those will help to create fear and disorder if they are carried out continuously and supplemented by small scale riots. These tactic should be continued until the right time when outside forces are notified and a coordinated attack is launched. It is advantageous to create distrust or open hostility between the enemy and the puppet before launching the riot from within. Mosts without any coordinated attack from outside are only of nuisance value and can not be considered a response attack.

- 14. Important Points for Coordinated Inside Outside ...ttack
- a. The commander responsible for riots within should consult with the commander of outside forces in order to establish the timing and signals for coordinating the attack. Both should be prompt and take advantage of the opportunity.
- b. Secrecy and cunning are the requirements for a successful internal response. Therefore all plans and movements inside a town or city must necessarily be kept secret to avoid enemy anticipation.
- 5. Deployment of A Riot
 - a. Deployment during a riot

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- (1) During the time of a riot, enemy guards or police at the city or village gates should be "removed" so that the forces from outside may enter for the coordinated attack.
- (2) After summing up the true condition during the arm riot by comparing enemy strength and terrain against ours, guarrillas should divide the fighting into districts and use their main strength to take important objectives. In the meantime, the rest of the troop should keep up the pressure on the enemy. Communication lines should be cut previously to enticipate enemy rescue units. The troops should be shifted to another objective quickly after one has been taken and thus continue the fighting.
 - (3) Contacts for different units should be very reliable. Personnels should carry coded identification. Contact signals such as gunfire, fire signal, pyrotochnique, etc., should be prearranged before the attack. All should be easy and simple to identify.
 - (h) If the possibility of enemy reinforcement exists, guarrilla units should be sent out to guard the communications lines and area to prevent the call for help. When necessary, the withdrawal of our outside forces should protected.
 - (5) Fighting tactics in armed riot should follow the principle of street and village fighting. Building and terrain are used as fortifying points. Firing or throwing of hand grenades from upper story window is a way of stopping enemy approach.

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- (6) Since armed riot operates right inside the enemy area, it should be led by a person with determination and fierce heroism. Lower units should also be fed by persons with a genuse of self-sacrifice and devotion to the cause. When confronted by difficulty, units from other districts will, without any hesitation, join in and help each other. Under no condition will the enemy be allowed to fight and break our units individually.
- b. Deployment after a successful armed rict.
 - (1) Recover political control

After the enemy has retreated and our flag is heisted in town, the guarrillas should appoint a mayor for that town or village to regain political control. Administrative rules and procedures are then set up or planned.

(2) Disposition of callaborationists:

Laportant callaborationists should be put on public trial and punished. Their wealth is to be confiscated and used for the relief of the poor.

(3) Disposition of enemy supplies

All captured enemy supplies should be sent back for our use. If transportation or bulkiness prevent sending the supplies back, they should be destroyed or burned.

In addition, the duty of expanding the organization of the people's guerrillas, reestablishment of social order etc. are essential works after a successful armed riot.

c. Deployment after an unsuccessful riot.

In case of defeat, the troops should withdraw according to the condition existing at that time. If the routes of withdrawal are broken, swift withdrawal by dispersement or the tactics of disguise

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and infiltration are used.

After an unsuccessful assempt the headers should not withdrew early but should remain and observe the effect of defeat on the heaple. The thinking of the radice are simple. If the setench causes much grad and disappointment. After energy inspection and approximate are ever, the leaders and their subordinates should spread out eyer the area and propagandine. The people should be teld to continue their struggle and not let small defeat, weaken their determination.

Other area devicts are planned, its office aim of final victory.

6. The Uignirleance of Disturbance:

Disturbances are a form of apport or are a diversionary tactics. It is tactics designed to confuse the enemy on their satimate of our intention. It is similar to the attack while the enemy defends, a foint flanking attack, or deceptive retroct. Disturbances are also a form of attaction to mosts the enemy! Attach and give the guerrillas a better position. If the situation is right the guerrillas should concentrate their forces and attach while the energy is in a state of confusion resulting from disturbances.

Riots and disturbances have a very close relationship. The methods and utilizations of the two are different. Prequently both rhot and disturbance are employed together. Riot is supplemented by disturbances to increase the fury and scope of the armed riot. On the other hand, disturbances may be aided by riot to expend the results.

The goal of a disturbance, regardless of the strongth available for the guerrilla, is to hinder the enemy's freedom of movement, keep them on the alert, and to grind away their military a trength. Before starting the tactics of disturbances, careful intelligence on the enemy's condition should be gathered and studied, so that the best moment for the

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operation may be chosen.

7. The tastics of Disturbance

The methods for disturbances have no set formula. All the other tactics rise by guerrillas may be used for disturbances. The only difference is that the objective of those tactics is to destroy the enery and not merely disturb them.

There are four nethods from the various guerrilla tactics that may be adopted for disturbance works

- 1. "Distribunces at separate points" (or advence and raid at separate points)
 - 2. "Essintaining constant contacto"
 - j. "pecoptive demonstration"
 - h. "Swift movement and emprise"

(a) Mivance and raid separately

The aim of "advence and raid on separate points is to expand the area where guerrillas may disturb the enemy. This method is used when guerrilla strength is rather large and troops may be assigned to numerous points as disturbance units. The unit is the facal point of the disturbance unit. Proquently the unit is subdivided into dualler groups. Their mission is to attack the enemy whenever they are able to get close enough, or to make foint demonstration and to frighten the enemy into taking incoherent defensive measures.

The important point to remember in connection with this tectic of advence and raid separately is that of maintaining some reasonable contacts among units. The result would be far greater if the units are able to Launch a simultaneous and coordinated raid. Separately

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advance, but simultaneous, attack is an ideal factor in avoiding any individual failure; separate attacks can be very successful if the movements are swhit and the attack forceful.

based on intelligence concerning the enemy's degree of preparation, condition around the error, the entent of the enemy's control over the troops, their communication, the terrain and routes of our advances, the hiding areas before the attack, the temporary base aroun, etc. all these points must be carefully considered, planned and executed at appropriate times. Neutration or delay would afford the enemy valuable time to effect counter measures.

If energy security is aspecially keen and effective, special weather conditions such as a storm, for, rain, dark night, etc., may be utilize to achieve the objective of disturbances.

To effect a disturbance over wider area, routes of enemy retreat, communication, etc. which may be used by resuce troops should be cut off or raided.

b. Maintaining constant controt

The objective of maintaining constant contact with the enemy is to keep the pressure on them and protect our main forces. This is very important in the disturbance tactics. To maintain contact is to fight and follow the enemy constantly but to avoid major or decisive battle. If the enemy pursues we withdrew; if they stop, we attack, if they withdrew we pursue, etc. This will frustrate both their attempt to annihilate our forces and their willingness to stop.

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This type of tactics demands nountainous terrain and winding trails for concealment and surprise. The guerrillas engaging in this operation should recruit and use the local peoples as outler guards, observers, and interligence patrols. They should gether information on enemy movement, bivones areas and communication lines for our use. The guerrilla should been themselves one or the nountains [fills] away or several miles from the operating area to avoid energy capture.

This type of markers depends on quality and training of men and not the number of men. With small groups of troops we use able to contact and disturb many. The enemy can only fight but never destroy our forces. By this constant contact and attrition ever a long period of time, the enemy's strength and morals as well as materials will be enhanced. They will gleady choose to abandon occupying the district, troop stations or communication points to evoid disturbances. When such time approaches, the guarrilles should quickly gather their expensith and launch a grantal attack.

c. Deceptive Demonstration

energy, it is necessary to carry out deceptive demonstrations, raise a great furor, incite the people for assistance and at the same time rise the elite guarrillas to conduct real and fierce raids on the energy to terrorise them. If the energy withdraws, regardless of strength, the guarrilla should maintain their furor and deceptive demonstration and continue the strong attack. During the expedition of 1927, when our revolutionary

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army penetrated deep into Jehel, about a score of soldiers were able to attack troops of regimental strength and disarm over a thousand rifles. In the Russian revolution, several guerrillas hiding along the retreating route of the ener's troop were able to stop the movement of two regiment of soldiers and their attached calvary and artillery.

When the enemy occupies on erea, try to immobilize their troops by surrounding the are with idden patrols; make foint attacks; spread runors; or conduct decontive descentivation to horass the enemy. Knowing such an operation, the occupational troop will soldom venture to come out.

d. Swift and Sudden Wovement

the times to use swift movement and sudden attack is earing the time when intelligence on energy conditions is not available. Elaborate preparations are not needed for this swift and sudden raid. This type of attack is best suited when the enemies are retreating in a state of confusion. We matter how successful the attack on the enemy retreating column may be, the guerrillas should keep the momentum and forcefulness of the attack and maintain their usual speed. Through this rapid movement and attack tactics achieves some results similar to that of surprise attack, it however, belongs to the disturbance category.

The following are important points for swift movement and attack tactics:

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- (1) Distance covered by the force: the merch should be great.
 - (2) Sudden swift attack means an equally swift withdrawal.
 - (3) This tactics may be used in breaking an enemy trap.
- (h) Utilize the service of captured troops who occupied or guarded installations and stations priviously.

8. Operation After the Disturbance

Disturbance is not like fighting a decisive battle; therefore troop power should be economized. No matter what methods are employed and what degree of success is attained, the usual operation after a disturbance raid, is withdrawal.

D. Portified Defence and Secreted Marth Tactics

"Portified defense" and ecoroled earth are the last and also the most important tactics for exerciles. The aim is, as for as scoroled earth is concerned, economic variance. Before using the "fortified defense" and scoroled earth incitics, consultation must be made with the highest regular military headquarters, since such tactics involve large scale construction and heavy expense. Orders from the high command of the regular error are needed before executing the tactics.

The area for fortified defense and scorched earth tactics should be within 50 to 150 kilomotors of the fighting Line. Scorched earch means that within this area all wealth, including money, food stuffs, fuels, livestocks, rolling stocks and other goods should be evacuated. All other permanent objects such as building wells, mines and materials which may not be moved in time, should be destroyed. Nothing of value should be left for the enemy.

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Fortified defense means that within this area all roads should be destroyed; trenches, gun posts and obstacles should be built, rivers and stream should be held back and water gates used to release water to deter enemy advance. Villages are converted into gun posts to protect the flamks of our regular troops. Frequently raids and disturbances are made on the enemy to create unbalance, so that our regular troops may come in and destroy them.

1. Operation of Scorehod Sarth Tactics

Secrebed earth operations may be divided into two types: occupied area and fighting area. In occupied area, the objectives are to aggitate the people into forming a non-cooperative attitude toward enemy's accommic or political demands, and resist enemy's non-military penetration. In this fighting area, try to carry out the destruction of all goods that we are unable to evacuate and which are valuable to the enemy. Though scorched earth is a form of economic warfare, yet it demands great sacrifice from the people. Because of the heavy sacrifice, it is difficult to execute. The guerrillas should be firm in supervising the tactics at any place and any time for good results.

2. Scorched Earth in Occupied Areas.

There are three measures which the enemy is using tocestroy our economy.

- (1) Buy all agricultural and industrial goods at a cheap price.
- (2) Hire all Chinese workers in the occupied area at low wages.

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(3) Dumping of many goods

The three methods are closely related. They intend to enalave the whole resple. Since the people in the occupied area are unable to rise up and slay all the enemy, their resistance to economic enalavement should be as follow:

a. Boycott -nemy Goods

The aim of boycott is to resist enemy economic encroachment, to destroy the markets which would result in over production, unemployment or even choss. This would weaken the chemy's expressive power. By so doing our own economic position will be strongthened. The methods of boycotts:

- (1). Voluntary boycotts of enemy goods by the peoples. Propaganda and supervision may be carried out.
- (2). (merrillas should constantly destroy the trade routes and boware of smuggling by the enemy.
- (3) Merchants and traders who deal with the enemy should be warned and punished by the guerrillas.
- b. Stop Furnishing Man-power to Enemy

Since the resistance war, many people in occupied areas were deceived by callaborationists into working for the enemy. Many were forced into the enemy army, which resulted in a tragedy of "Chinese fighting the Chinese". It is imperative to stop the flow of manpower into enemy channels in occupied areas.

- (1) Guarrillas and disputed important routes and genters and stop the flow of young men from the country to the city.
- (2) therrillas should intensify their propagands to discourage the people from serving the energy.
- (3) Guerrillas should keep control of rosts, thus assisting refugees in their evacuation to the interior. In case of
 deténtion by the enemy suerrilla personnels may pretend to be
 deal, mate or dust, and escape at the earliest opertunity.
- (h) querrilla troops should try at the earliest moment, to convert an occupied area tate a querrilla metive area, organize the workers and farmers into people's querrilla units, and expand querrilla warfare in general.

e. Mandargo of daw Laterials to Enemy

Our country is a joint producer of many raw materials. The enemy after occupying the tand, will try to emploit and selecthem. To prevent the flow of important raw materials such as goins, jour-chies, cottons, wools, clothes, from, cooper, coals, tune oil, salts, food stuffs, etc., measures should be taken to disperse or destroy them. Livestocks and transportation and work equipments in occupied areas should be transferred to avoid their being taken by the enemy.

3. Scorched Earth Tactics in Fighting Zone

All types of goods or materials which can not be removed from the fighting zones should be destroyed. These include: manpower, raw materials, equipments, wells, water supplies, food stuffs, etc.

a. In the preparation of scorehed earth tactics, the following point should be carefully taken and considered:

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- (1) The numbers of young and old peoples is the population of the secretal earth district or the secretal district.
- (2) we the production of food study such as vice, where etc. in the district self sufficient or show a surplus!
- (3) that is the quantity, if any, or door states weing bilities of pounchelds and merchanter
- (h) that are the numbers of various liverbook in the Habriet including horse, cules, cattles and sheep?
- (5) that ero the numbers of villages of all times and number of walls, public or private, in entauented
- to the first step in the correlationth saction to assum all subjected as in the district to guarrill, suited and to evacuate the rest of the population to the rest of the population to the rest of the population have failed to sometime the few people the necessity of the measure.
- e. If the evacuating the people from this righting some, all food soulf should be confidented in the rest. All secretly hidden foods stuff should be confidented and send to the rest.
 - c. The transportation aminals, raise and horses and equipment, trusts and costs should so cent to the interior if not needed in the secret earth district.
 - c. All bridges in the scorehed earth district should be wrecked after securing approval from the high command of the regular army in the district.

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- f. Wells and water supply points in the district should be descripted when they are not valuable to our own troops.
- Enther the to swift energy savagees or to the nature of goods where evacuation is not feesible, all food stuffs and fuels another be destroyed. Not one piece of wood or straw is all owed to benefit the energy.
- h. Disprehentive plans should be made with regards to rectories and minos in the separate court district. Try to move all sachinery if possible. These that esmeet be moved should be secretly and especially obsessing from the enemy. If they fall into enemy hands, therefolls should be ment in secretly to destroy them.

 h. Significance of Fortified Defense

the aim of fortified detense sarrars by guardiles is to hold the enemy from breaking through in the flunks, for a long-term start. It is used to defend the important strategic points in protecting guardilla units in their attack. Thus fortified defense is divided into two: the defense of strategic key points and defense using costacles.

T. Tectics in Using Obshacles

Defence by obstacles is the most negative measure in warfare. The only objective is to make enemy attack difficult and costly. The result and effectiveness depends directly on the scale and second of work expanded in the obstacles. Constructed as well as natural obstacles should be utilized.

a. Obstacles in Rivers and Streams

Blockade the rivers and problems shipping. Times, bou-wires,

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steel opstacles, sunken snips or rocks, etc., may be use in rivers and harvors to blockade enemy shipping.

Miferentiation should be made on the temporary and permanent nature of the obstacles. Mines, sunker books or rock structures are for permanent use. ...ooden and bost wire obstacles are of emporary nature.

Materials use for constructing the custacles should be easily accessible, postess cood endurance properties and can be sumoflaged easily.

b. Oustacles in Lakes and Marshus

Lakes and marshes may be utilized as a defense objects. Under certain circumstance, the enemy may so larged into such places and attacked. Enemy mechanized troops lose their superiority when required to operate in the low lands and marshes. Such areas are good sanctuary from mechanized attacks.

c. Obstacle by clooding

rlooding is a measure which would cause great consequence to the people living in the area and require much engineering work and time. Its use as an obstacle for defense should have the approval of the highest commant. Secret plans should be made with recard to areas and methods used for flooding. There are two types of flooding that is to allow the water to flow in the area of the flood or to prevent the flow of water out. There are four methods for accomplishing it: opening and shutting the watergates, building up or demolishing the panks and dikes.

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One meter depth of flood water would immobilize all men, animal-drawn vehicles, and military vehicles not over ten tons. If the floor of flood area is soft, half a meter deep flood will five the same result.

d. Chap are in dang

Early destruction should be made on railroads, highway and broad roads in the lighting zone.

pranch roads feeding the main route should be destroyed. Worker guerrillas should be sent to the area for surveillance from time to time. The roads should be destroyed again if they have been repaired by the enemy. Land mines may be used in supplementing the blockeds.

Marrow and long winding roads are the nest for building obstacles. Troops may be used to defend the strategic points on the road. For permanency, position may be built behind the roads.

6. Methods in Defending Aey-Points

In the warfare of fortified defense, natural terrain as well military power are used in the defense of key strategic points.

Defense of key strategic points is the duty of the regular army. It is a tremendous construction work to build defences and fortify the point against frontal or flanking attacks. Though the people can not initiate the work, they can assist in furnishing manpower and equipment to the regular army in the construction of defences.



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Querrillas may use the defense, a ser the regular army withdrew, to harass the enemy from the flanks or the front. Such pressure on the enemy would tend to drive them back further on the defensive and weaken their offensive power.

dominating tactics. It is not a "do or die" defense on one position, out a planned and permanent outwark for the whole area and frent. The guerrillas are the main driving force in this defense to organize the peoples; train the sale todied men; help evacuate the ged and the weak; forging of weapons, construction of transhes and fortifications by using walls, buildings, and hills; and maintaining communication and contacts in the area. The fortified defense district should be between 50 and 150 kilometers away from the major fighting line. Such tactic would allow the people in the area to defend their own lives and wealth, punish their own callaborationists, assist in guerrilla activities and help regular troops.

a. Defending Key Positions

People's guerrilla should be used to construct fortifications along natural defense terrain such as rivers and streams, lakes and marshes, high mountains, heavy wooded areas, harbors, winding and narrow roads flooded fields etc. The fortifications should be constantly improved and strengthened. Roads from this area to the fighting lines of the regular troops should also be improved and strengthened if possible. Such roads provide means for quick reenforcement from other points when needed.

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o. Defense of Key Points

In the vicinity or compart line of the secreted earth district or in front of key strategic positions or open terrain, nelect some high points and fortify them as important observation and key points. Ten men or so me sent to defend them a sinst penetration by enemy or ervers and patrols, and various activities of callaborationists and small enemy forces. If large forces are launched for a decisive attack, we chould withdraw into the fortified village for the defence.

e. Defende of sillages

Each village should be defended in the accrehed earth district as a single unit. Village walls, trenches and tall houses should be utilized for building the defenses. All substances means should assist in constructing fortific tion and gather weapons for self-defense. South a village unit is able to repel about one hundred energy troops. If the energy is using artillary pieces, guerrilla personnel should dispurse to various areas in the villages. If the attacking energy is over serveral hundreds in number, guerrillas should withdraw into a linked fortification before or during the night of the attack, to avoid defending untenable positions.

d. Defense of Linked Fortifications

In about every hundred kilometer along the lines, choose a village or town which possesses good defensive terrain features and fortify it as the center of the linked defense. If the

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energy coollines over a thousand ren together with elements of mechanized troops to areack this strongly fortified position, the querrilla should use the tauties of directing witherand to have the energies to other centers of lined defense and attack them by callaborating with guerrillas at that genter, or they can make use of helps from the regular troops and basic guerrillas troops to attack them. During the energy's withdrawal, querrillas from all the conters of linked defense may launch a significance of the content of linked defense may launch a significance attack. If our forces are adequate, we should pursuit the energy and try to deatroy them.

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Here one must notice the form of the obserm, and use the following criteria: narrow channel; oreas valley; noderate speed; straight course; see loottem; strong and level panks; our side sanks higher than opposite; forcy equipment easily collected.

B. Crouding

1. A stream may be proposed by urity e, ferry, or ford. The method is to be decided by stream conditions, ferry equipment, and strength of chem. In agains, only fording or forced transport in possible; ferry or article erossin, should be done at night or under cover of 10, or smoke; only thus will it be successful. Inter crossin, mover as a rule, return to the same terry. Consequently farry equipment should be destroyed or let thest army. This is specially true when retreating.

2. As a rule, querrillas should make crossing a unauspected by the enemy; unless necessary, they should never cross in front of the enemy, for fear of exposure. An enforced crossing in front of the enemy should be prepared for by acouting and making careful secret plans, or by a detachment making a simulated crossing at some other point, then protecting the troops who are crossing by heavy machine—fun fire. After crossing, if the enemy comes to intercept, attack him at once, and shoot down those who oppose the crossing, to protect our troops who are to follow.



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3. The portion of crossing troops that first arrives on the other side, should not make their first target too far may; it should be on the enemy's flank or room, and sithin sight and range of our men on the other side. Note for a full number to cross, these enlarge the scope of fighting.

h. Querrilles, in forms fightings, had sent utilize trilight and rogs to avoid seing his tree sir and land; in daytime erosain, a, make maximum use of anti-aircraft firing and marning, and choose several counts for martiaged crossess. If there is no urgancy, it is sent to gross at night.

C. Dol'onne of Straums

In defense of atreams, first find out what reuse the energy expects to take and their preparations for probability then decide upon the actuals of defense.

- 1. Dispose the main cold of troops along our bank near to the snew! principal crossin point. It counter-actack can be made it should be on the opposite bank; make the needed preparation such as setting up a princehead protection. If we have a large detachment and heavy tune, place them in an emergency stronghold, or prepared strong-carefully camouflaged to prevent detection.
- 2. Sentinels should be posted at intervals to observe anticipated chear crossin, points. On large rivers, scout skift's or agmed coats can be used to patrol constantly.
- 3. Long-term sentinels should have their lines ordinarily on this side of the river, and be strong enough to prevent their crossing before

boing fully prepared. Made mines in the mater, or stiked posts, or wire entanglements, to hinter their crossing.

ii. Take Erect care that emergency brooks, or propage troops, are not sectived by Felonel enemy movements. Also there should be untiairceaft observation and shooting dudymint. Se still more careful miter dark.

D. Keering in Touch

Troops the cross 24 of should eavey their cade and fluiding your, to keep in touch with the main body on the other bank. If they areas simultaneously at several points, all the more must they continually keep in touch. After erossing they can string telephone enclass over or on or the river. Lentinels can use telephone or signals.

Section L. Guerrilla Work on Lakes and Fonds

lake-country offers, oo: terrain for merrilla eases; for lakes are con likested, meshes acount, travel is hard; these are important natural mestacles. Also, lake country to operacly settled, and far from big towns, offering excellent rear pases for querrithms.

In lake country troop movements are difficult, especially for large bodies and heavy curs which are really hard to move; hence it sules dol'ense not offense.

A. Defense

In defending lakes, there must be strong blocking of roadways and waterways, setting up a wide warning net on land and water at the outer ring, using villages and fishing boats. At the important points, build earthworks for help in holding; carofully control the roads to other important points, making early preparation for oreaking or blocking.

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Collect all morts of nosts, concealing them near the main voly of prepared troops. Auti-aircraft measures are the more important, so as to allow attacks by directions water route at at ht, or for transport to another stronghold or side.

B. Attack

Since a large energ force cannot enter lake country, energy can's left there are of communicati, and noutly given to defende an . Astering so quaratlies ought to so make to eversome them may time.

the the lake reople and ticherner as addes, or co-operators from within; this allows close approach to the energy with absultions one attacks from one; since committee in crudian; resistance and asserting our serestly thend of same all avenuess or help. The villagers and distribute to cut sires as soon as an actuek begans.

I. Amored motor-couts can be used for protection, so such the better. If an attack fails, these may be depended on for protection. It is order to retreat by eater than by land.

C. Getting messales through

Consumication in lake country is naturally very difficult, and even move for abbackers then for defenders. Creinarily use flags, signal shots or wireless telephone.

stetion . Guerrilla work in Forests

Forests are the pest place for guerrillas to cause disturbance and lend themselves to embushing. In tacties, the value is determined by area, density, roadways, and outline form.

A. Advantages and Mandvantages

- 1. Advantages:
 - (a) Obstruct energy's line of vision, on land and in air;
 - (b) Taches effectiveness of enemy fire;
 - (c) Energ cannot hove heavy equipment;
 - (d) hay lisison with our rear with Front.
- 2. Maadvantages!
 - (a) Hard to determine spot and to link up with nearby treeps;
 - (a) May to love one lighting in large forest;
 - (c) The direct of scope of lower cadres is limited;
 - (1) Possible to se attacked, set fire to, or given poison, by energy anymhere, andtime;
 - (a) Sapable of increasin enemy fire /7 and poisoning in offectiveness.

S. Attack

In a forest attack, sotice the conditions of the woods, the position of the energic chief resistance line, the surrounding terrain, and poculiar actions of the enemy. It conditions permit, let part or whole of your Force surround the energ flank or circle around to his rear, where a nighly successful abback can be made.

then using forest amough to intercept the enemy, it is post to locate deep in the forest on both sides of enemy line of advance, or on all sides of him.

C. Defense

when relying on forest for defense, decide on its most important stronghold in the light of existing conditions. Ordinarily, when using the forest to cover rear liaison, the chief stronghold should be at the

front. If you wish to bill off the enemy, lure him into the forest, and when he is out of ranks, turn on him, bein, helped by the forest all around you. If you are trying to cover a retreat, take the woods as enter line of patcle.

If in an amount operation, it is now necessary to evolvioring seen or neard by the enemy; shun all conting of equipment, aims in the trees, talk and smoking. Tops important, secure, sentiacle, site, should be sent out; by—aths should be jointed out to the treeps quickly and samy limited out force should be posted.

O. Sending Resoures of the forest, in time of amough defence, are cost Communications in the forest, in time of amough defence, are

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easily sent by telephone; for a forest has many tree-trunks, suitable for stringing wires, which can thus escape enemy vision and reach the front with messages. Otherwise use courier dogs, which can find their way back in the forest. Other means of signalling are unsuitable, because forest leaves obstruct vision.

Section 6. Querrilla Work in the Villages.

A Guerrillas not only operate in open country, but also attend to deferme of villages, which also offer opportunities for guerrillas.

A. Attack

- 1. In regular warfare, attacking villages is generally avoided; sometimes a small band is sent to watch it, while the main body detours around it. But when guerrillas attack villages in the enemy's rear where enemy troops are stationed, or where grain and munitions are stored, the villages must be really held, to get results. So in guerrilla warfare, villages are considered the focal point in fighting, first attacking the fringes, then striking the strong points. Though large sacrifice is involved, it is worthwhile.
- 2. Before attacking, get information about the terrain and the enemy, and on arriving at the outskirts, attack and also post guards for observation and cover; and after entering seal all exits.
- 3. If conditions permit, infiltration may be used, for pincer attack from inside and out; or simulate attack from the front, sending a strong force on detour to flank and rear; then it is best to force one's way in by force of superior numbers.

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At such a time guarrilla heavy guns should be placed in commanding position on high ground or housetops, to evercome enemy resistance by fierce fire.

- 4. After entering the village, take care not to mistake friendly troops, but bravely focus on wiping out enemy stragglers. The villagers can be used in this work. Special care is needed for unusual buildings, collars, etc., in searching for enemy ambush or valuable goods left behind.
- 5. In advancing on a village for attack, use yards, gardens, ditches, fences, wells, etc., for cover; avoid paths swept by enemy machine-guns, to lessen casualties.

B. Dofense

- l. In villago deferse, careful plans should be made beforehand. On outlying roads, build blockade works, and sot up support points by means of strong edifices and natural terrain, as fighting centers between fortifications and open country. But the chief battle line must be pushed to the front of the village or across its middle, always taking care to avoid its becoming a straightline with the edge of the village, to be raked by enemy fire.
 - 2. As the enemy approaches, concentrate fire in front of our ramparts, to destroy him. If perchance he should force his way in, hinder his advance by internal blockades and flank earthworks, and also prepare a detour to his flank and rear, to stop him with hand to hand combat.
 - 3. If initial combat does not bring victory, remove troops into the village, doploying them among the streets and houses, for temporary

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holding; if the enemy is reinforced, lock the buildings, place mines at all points, then retreat.

4. In defending a village, take special care against fire and poison.

C. Liaison

Village guerrillas find it very hard to keep in touch; word of mouth and visible signals serve best.

After a village is captured, if there is a desire to use the existing communications not, careful inspection should be made, and lines to the enemy cut, before using. All personnel in charge of smae should be brought to one place, and all enemy equipment soized, to prevent surprise.

Section 7. Guerrilla Work in Cities.

Cities are conters for enemy invasion, and bases for military extension into the interior. Politically, they are the seat of enemy and puppet government, a hideout for traitors and collaborators; in the economic sphere, because of the dense population, goods and money are found there; culturally, they set the pace for the interior and are the base for enemy enslavement of our people.

Therefore guerrillas will seek chances for fierce attack on our occupied cities, no matter how strict are enemy gendames; the secret troops of laborers and students, men and women, should look on city guerrillas as the core.

The chief method of urban guerrillas is creating disturbance, and response to our suburban guerrillas; by arrangements between the two, street fighting should begin.

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Street fighting by regulars usually comes after a city is taken; by guerrillas, beforehand and early (starting as inside response) this is the method of creating disturbance by attacking and causing fear.

A. Attack

- 1. Outside response troops, before beginning attack, should scout with all their might, on the following
 - a. Approaches for attack; outskirt terrain; plan of city streets and open spaces;
 - b. Disposition of enomy guards; defense set-up; city rule, etc.
 - c. Strength, type, and morale of enemy troops; police strength, etc.
 - d. Our incide response troops, strength and plans for disturbance.

B. Dofense

- 1. In city defense, the fortifications and blockades of the chief defense line should make use of strong buildings and natural terrain, and should as far as possible plant mines explosives and obstacles at suitable points, to stop the advance of army vehicles.
- 2. Details of defense should follow street plans and conditions of thoroughfares. Enemy lines of advance, and areas, may be divided into thus many fighting grounds; and then the total force can be divided into main reserve force and holding guard for each fighting ground; and these divided into local reserve and street guard bands.
- 3. When enemy troops come near a street blockade, the street guard must mow them down in front of the blockade with murderous fire. If enemy troops have entered a certain street, attack them hard from behind earthworks, so as to stop them; also have the local reserves slip around to

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their flank and rear for hand to hand killing. Never let the fighting flow over into other streets.

4. When a large part of the enemy force has come into a certain fighting area, use guards from other places to stop his advance, and use part or most of the main reserves to strike him by a detour, not letting the fight flow over into nearby places.

5. When the guerrillas have not force enough to defend streets, they should retire at once without delay.

C. Retreat

If defeated in street fighting, they should burn and destroy as per provious plan, and retire scattered along convenient roads. If propared to return soon for counter-attack, setting fire is not needed.

A small rearguard should be left hidden, while the main body retires, with ranks broken.

Section 8. Guerrilla Work against Fortresses.

Attacking enemy city fortifications, is a very difficult matter in guerrilla warfare; because enemy fortifications and towns are very strongly defended and have thorough warning systems, and these are hard to overcome. Strong attack must be accompanied by a high degree of aroused disturbance, so as to attain final victory through joint action.

A. Attack

Men regulars wish to capture a city or fort, they mostly rely on air and artillery bombing; when guerrillas want to capture a city or fort, they must use the most crafty wiles, for night attack, infiltration, or luring out a sally, to arrive at their goal.

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- 1. Night attack. Wait until the city-wall guards are fully asleep, and sentinels are carcless, then draw near the walls, choose skilled grenade throwers to steal in and throw grenades, scaring and killing the enemy to no small degree; then follow with a fierce attack. Unless the guards on the walls are seasoned fighters, they will be terrified and confused this time, and the whole crowd will be killed by us.
- 2. Infiltration. Before guerrillas come up to the walls to attack, send some plain-clothed men, disguised as peasants or enemy soldiers to give alarm to the wall guards. This approach to the walls will cause the enemy to suspect nothing else; then the main body of guerrillas, secretly following, push right in after them. If the plain-clothes men get near the walls, they can pull out dagers and kill the guards; the guerrillas by nimble action can force their way in, kill the enemy troops who are wholly unprepared. Being taken by surprise, they easily give up their arms.
- 3. Luring out. Send a small band of guerrillas to a village near enemy city walls to start a disturbance and lure the enemy out to fight. If this stratagem succeeds, enemy ramparts are emptied, or with strength divided he is weak. Our main body in ambush nearby can quickly take possession, block his egress and check his return.

Guerrillas attacking large cities in the rear of theenemy, also can use the methods named above, and bring many guerrillas in secretly. This lends itself to organizing citizens and laborers for a pre-arranged tumult, as an inside response.

C. Defense

Defending city ramparts is of course a responsibility of regular troops, but when guerrillas are ordered to aid in defense, besides their

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duty to act in accord with directions from the regular guards, they should pay heed to maintaining order in the city, supply necessities, and make full use of the people's strength.

Chapter 18. Guerrilla Work under Special Weather Conditions.

Under special weather conditions, such as night rains, extreme cold or heat, guerrilla warfare has special advantages, benetrating deep into our interior, with land and people strange, it is hard for them to keep tranquil, and very easy for guerrillas to attack.

Section 1. Night Guerrilla Work.

In night fighting a few can overcome the many, because while our strength may be small, the enemy does not know this well; while the enemy may be numerous, a large body is hard to maneuver at night; under such a conditions an ambush attack in force, or creating tunult, can be/serious blow to him.

- A. Pros and Cons of Night Fighting
 - 1. Advantages in Night Fighting
 - a. Causes the enemy to be attacked, his preparation delayed, direction difficult, cooperation ineffective, not easy to get reinforcements.
 - b. Enomy finds it hard to observe us, and because of our movements and goals being concoaled, his superior fire-power loses its threat.
 - c. Easy to approach enemy, destroy his obstructions, or fool him.
 - d. Possible to choose point of attack, secretly collect large force, make sudden assault;

- e. Night attack spreads fear and rout among the enemy.
- f. Easy to ahake enemy's will to fight, so he will not dare come out for this purpose; thus a retreat before him is less costly.
- a. Our directing is also difficult, Liaison and cooperative activities of various bands often fails.

2. Disadvantages in Might fighting.

- b. Before attack, time epont in preparation is very long; after attack is over, hard to coordinate troops; so attack is hard, and confusion is easy.
- c. Easy to lose direction of movement and goal of spearhead strike; so fighting fails, or results in misunderstanding with friendly troops.
- d. Not easy to analyze enemy conditions or their changes; therefore very difficult to set up precautions.
- e. Night movements easily tire the troops, and easily injure our brave active cadres and troops.

Since the pros and cons of night fighting are as stated above, a guerrilla chief when planning night movements should make careful study of the project, enemy status, terrain; and then as far as he can, avoid the troubles and reap the victory of night fighting.

B. Points to Notice in Night Activities.

Night fighting as a rule should surprise the enemy, with a brupt strike and sudden strong attack. Night shooting has little effect and is apt to disclose our goal, slow our progress, reduce our punch in assaulting. So these points must be observed in night fighting;

1. Discipline: Strictly observe army rules; no smoking or lighting fire; preserve silence.

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- 2. Weapons: Thoroughly inspect before setting out, to see if they are damaged, and whether they make any sound when being carried.
- 3. Equipment: Troops should be lightly equipped, rifles unloaded, grenades noted to be in safety status. Baggage and food are left behind.

C. Types of Night Attack

1. Dawn Attack. This is used for attack at a long distance. In the depth of winter, or very dark days, guerrillas often attack from more than 100 li distant, seizing a time when the enemy is not prepared, to come near and attack. Such attacks are usually made at dawn, for at that hour the enemy is off guard and attack is easy.

Dawn attack is different from that by regulars. In such case, there are definite states of attack and defense by both sides, and preparation for fighting; or there is a battleground which both occupy in part, where contact has already been made, and the unfinished struggle lasts on into the night; or because night is unsuitable for directing work, it is postponed until daybreak. Either side can surmise the possibility of enemy attack, and take strict precuations, so dawn attack is not a surprise riad. Darkness is only utilized for drawing near, and the light of early morn for directing the attack.

Querrilla dawn attack means a long journey during the night, and while the band may be far smaller than the enemy, yet since the latter do not know of its sudden approach, still less can they know its position and its numbers, they are totally unprepared and a surprise raid is easy. The two cases are quite different.

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What must be noted is this: After a dawn attack there should be swift retreat, and this should be chosen for a time of heavy storm or fog, in order to ensure a safe getaway.

2. Evening Attack. This is a time when enemy troops are shifting positions from one place to another, and guerrillas can make a surprise raid. The latter should get advance information on their movements and dispose themselves accordingly, waiting until the enemy arrives at his new place, when his sentincis are not posted, his knowledge of the terrain not yet good, his quarters not fixed, his order not set up, then quickly and sharply attack.

If by chance the enemy has made ready early, and resists fiercely, and the attack fails, then the only thing is to retreat. This can be done safely, because the enemy will not done pursue after nightfall.

3. Attack in the Depth of Night. This is common guerrilla tactics. In the early evening, advance stealthily, and when about 10 li from the goal, quietly rest and explore, decide on plans and proparations. Then in the dead of night, when the enemy are sound asleep, quickly draw near, and attack in spots; or, focus strength on assaulting a weak point, or his barracks, warehouse, or planes as heavily as possible.

If meeting stout resistance, and outclassed, gather your forces and make a safe retreat before dawn. If rescuing arrested or captured persons, night attack may also be used, taking advantage of the confusion to storm the jail for rescue.

Might attack is warfare marked by hardships and difficulty. Soldiers should be made acquainted with its crucial secrets, their morale should be raised, and they should be trained in the arts of bayonet and grenade

combat, and thoroughly disciplined for toil and pain, never allowed to falter through fear and doubt. By bold decisive action in bitter hand to hand combat they must seize success in night assault.

- h. Night Attack Plans. Cleverness and complexity are not desired so much as simplicity and sureness. The goal of attack is determined by conditions at the time, and our aim in night attack; but breadth and depth should have reasonable dimensions.
 - a. In desiring to approach the enemy by night, use single file and an easily advancing form, without too many men so as to maintain sure and nimble progress. Highways and villages must be shunned to avoid dog barking that arouses notice. Also there must be close touch between bands, and scouts or patrols should be sent in advance, to look out for signs, such as voices, fires, etc., for the task of warning or concealing.
 - b. When in night attack we have come near the enemy or broken through his sentinel lines, one section will assault his defense line in order to involve the enemy. But the main strength will proceed quietly and quickly to the goal, and must put in the front line a strength sufficient for decisive battle and focus all strength as quickly as possible. This reserves must be near the front, they should avoid getting in the fight too early.
 - c. The opportune time for which night should wait is ordinarily when enemy sentinels have gone back after inspection, then steal in; as to the point for doing so, while determined by the aim of the assault, yet as a rule choose a weak point in the defense, or else near to us and easy for attack.

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As to a salient of the stronghold, attack it is at the rear, to to cut off the defenders! escape; if a recess is assaulted, let it be when the enemy is retiring from same; take care to avoid mistakenly clashing with friendly men.

d. If guerrillas on their march or while preparing for attack are discovered and fired on by the enemy, the guerrilla leader should firmly impose silence and not think of returning fire, lest their own location be disclosed.

If enemy fire is severe or accompanied by flares, lie down quickly; if the guerrillas have a small cannon, use it to destroy thelight, if the searchlight is within rifle range, set your best marksmen to hit it; but in destroying it, give wide berth to the location where your main body is hiding.

5. Night Liaison. A communications net for night guerrillas is entromely hard to set up. Position of telephone lines and electric flares must be carefully explored in daytime. Telephone lines take longer to string at night than in the day, injuries and breaks are harder to discover. So telephone wires should be strung along highways, for inspection at any time.

If in terrain where enemy vision is limited, flashlights or hand phones may be used to supplement; but flashlights are easily detected by the enemy; so covering tubes should be used, and much care exercised.

For the sake of distinguishing between friend and foe in night fighting, special insignia, such as white cloth or white feathers should be used. Also, special command words, pass words, and warnings.

The trouble with using wireless in the night is in the noise made by the transmitter. The enemy, hearing it, can infer the location of our CONFIDENTIAL

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troops; therefore it must not be used near an enemy point. Hand transmitters are best.

Dog couriers can be used night or day, but pigeons cannot function at night. Tracer bullets are especially effective in the darkness, but their effectiveness is equal to both sides; so take care as to place and occasion; they are best used at the beginning of or retreat from night attack.

Might fighting is full of kalcidoscopic changes, so for safety and genuineness of signals, there should be men ready in the signal corps, set apart, that there be no break in the messages. Moreover, in night travel more guides must be employed, to avoid losing the way.

Section 2. Guerrilla Work in Depth of Winter or Heat of Summer.

Use of troops in deep winter or summer is naturally shunned by military leaders; but guerrillas should use such times to obtain victory.

Fighting in the depth of winter consumes the soldier's strength by the cold; and because daylight is short, progress of fighting is reduced, so there is special advantage in night attacks or surprise raids. Guerrillas seizing a time when the enemy is huddled for fear of cold, or crowding up to a fire or meal, can attack suddenly, before the enemy can get together, and thus give him a beating. But before attacking in severe cold, arouse high spirits, and see that men and horses are well fed.

Fighting in hot weather needs to use ambush and sudden strikes.

Iuring the enemy a long way, and when he is sweating and panting, tired and ready to quit, take advantage of the slope to cut him off.

Also, just before dawn, the enemy, tired from toil the day before, is sleeping soundly; a night attack at this time easily yields results.

Section 3. Guerrilla Work in Wind, Snew, Rain, Fog.

Regular troops usually avoid fighting decisive battles in such weather, because of the difficulty of using heavy weapons; so guerrillas should use just such a chance for sumprise raids and creating tumult.

- 1. Fast Running up in the rain, close surprise raid, often brings a big victory. For after a long rain, both sides stop, and are no longer alert, and lookouts are slack, and heavy weapons cannot be used well; plane scouting is difficult. So it is easy to overcome the enemy when he is not ready.
- 2. Attack in heavy snow is like that in rain, but one must be all the more familiar with the ground; movements should be the more secret; and when marching you should use forests more, otherwise you are without cover on a snowy expanse. If the guarrilles are not covered and the path is not clear, it is easy to be harracsed by the enemy. The days are cold and short, travel is difficult, poisonous gases are more effective, weather changes are harder to forecast. All these matters must be given special attention.

Enemy marching or heavy traffic in the snow gives guerrillas a rare chance for ambush and interception. But they themselves must have good terrain for ambush in order to be sure of victory.

Movement in the snow is very easy for the enemy to detect. It is hard to escape observation even at night, and forest cover should be used, or white clothing, to minimize indications as to goal.

Marching in snow, whether rough or slick, is very apt to cause fatigue, greatly reducing speed; so in casting up marching distance beforehand, it had better not be too far, say about one-half of an ordinary march; guards

should watch both sides; so depth of snow along the route, and enemy status, should all the more be carefully noticed.

Camping should be in barracks as a rule, with each bringing along fuel, food, bedding and implements. Camp guards should be plentiful, and on high ground protected from the wind; the commander should inspect personally, lest the soldiers hide in the buildings for fear of cold, or, without authority, get near a fire, where they can be observed.

- 3. Attacks in strong wind or dense fog, sufficient to conceal our movements catch the enemy off guard and give him a severe blow. And these same conditions make observation difficult, so artillery loses its target, and cannot be effective. Air operations also become impossible, so at such a time, there is chance for a surprise raid, with victory. But there must be beforehand, a thorough exploration of the weather, terrain, surface objects, enomy strength, etc. When fighting, the wind should be in one's favor, else sand blurs the eyes, leading to failure. Strong wind and dense fog also carry liability of easy failure, so the timing of an attack must be given special attention.
 - 4. For communicating during a fight in wind, rain, snow, or fog, flash-lights and pigeons are useless, and even tracer-bullets can be used over relatively short distances; but wireless and army telephones, though limited in efficiency, are comparatively serviceable, for at such times the enemy cannot either from the air or from the ground, observe our movements.

Section h. Guerrilla Work during Vacations or Festivals.

When the enemy has a vacation or festival, guerrillas ought to find it out long before, and make detailed preparation, so that when the time

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comes they can make surprise attack or fight by way of tumult. This can be done, even though enemy vigilance goes on as usual.

Because enemy guards are after all limited, and as they reason, there is now no need of vigilance, and the large number are strolling about or gathered in places of amusement; as soon as a warning is heard, there is apt to be confusion and fright, and trampling on each other. Or, with officers and men drinking, some will be lying drunk on the ground, with no strength to fight back — an excellent occasion for assault. Best of all, when the enemy are very gay, or the feast is not over, suddenly close all exits, strike close and hard, and victory is easy.

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PART VII

SUPPLY, SANITATION, AND BASES

Chapter 19: Querrilla Supplies

(uerrillas! food, munitions, clothing, money, etc can directly effect their growth and fighting; so the matter of supply is a most important guerrilla service.

Look at the guerrillas in each occupied area, what conditions have been brought about by the supply problem, saddening to us all! For when they started out, the government did not supply funds enough; nor did it supply them well, after they were organized. Now the guerrillas were not strong enough to supply themselves from the enemy, and when food was exhausted, some were billeted where they were, and others exacted food from the people, taking it from them as robbers do. None of their actions were what the people would choose, for all were violently oppressed time and again, till nurmars filled the air, and the people had nothing to live on. It resulted in the people moving out where guerrillas moved in, or bringing in the enemy to clean them out. What time is there to talk of sympathy and support?

Therefore the very guerrillas who recount stories of enemy violence follow them in the same conduct; guerrillas who cherish love of the people, themselves harm the people; guerrillas who aim to heighten the people's consciousness, are the ones who ruin the people's patriotism; guerrillas who undertake to rouse the people to resist, on the contrary unit them in opposing such resistance. If this goes on, what will happen to the mobilizing of the people for increased resistance?

We find that guerrilla discipline is not strict, their knowledge of the people is insufficient, and this is the real reason for obstacles hindering their growth and activity. The government merely gives orders for arousing, but pays no head to feeding, or proper supplying; this is the chief cause of the present bad condition.

Some say that these who join the guerrillas are at bottom metivated by the need for self and national defense, so their support is a matter of no great concern. But really, even if guerrillas, burning with desire to save the country, voluntarily join up, are they wholly without thought of their treatment, of food and pay? Even if they would do without the barest minimum bullets and food, can you expect them to resist with empty hands and stomachs? Moreover today there are many guerrillas falsoly so called, made up of erstwhile robbers and disbanded troops, who have no feeling for the people, and who cannot be continuously supplied. They will certainly belie the purpose of being recruited, when their old habits crop up again.

The wide extension of guerrilla warfare really is significant for deciding the success or failure of the entire nation's war of resistance. The serious problem of feeding and supplying guerrillas should never be neglected again!

Section 1. Sources of Supply

Since guerrillas should have swift maneuverability for independent fighting, great care should be taken as to supplying them without any interruption; there are in general 3 methods: living off the land; self-sustaining; getting from the enemy.


A. Living off the Land

- 1. Food is a prime necessity for life. Guerrillas, to hasten their secret movements, find it unsuitable to carry heavy leads of grain; so they usually try to secure needed food on the spot, buying from local people; as to status of local production, guerrillas should inform themselves ahead of time, and at the time send out political workers for propaganda and persuasion and pay out money for purchase.
- 2. If it is a guerrilla band organized by the people themselves, at first because the numbers are few, expenses are not heavy. With earnest political work, getting popular sympathy often results in nearby villages offering grain, even without pay. Moreover, many of the guerrillas are dwellers in these nearby villages, so the fear of scarcity should not arise.
- 3. As to supply of emmunition and health materials, at the beginning of organization weapons cannot be of adequate quantity; besides a few guns, most of the weapons will be spears, swords, etc., and without huge outlay in a fierce battle, the problem of supply of ammunition and health materials will be not too serious.
- h. Under specially hard conditions, the guarrilla band should send political workers to do propaganda work, arousing patriotic feelings and national ideas, causing warm sympathy for the guarrillas, leading the rich to contribute spontaneously, but unless unavoidable, compulsory exactions should not be employed, and still less may soldiers be allowed to ransack the homes where they are billeted, lest the local people resent and resist.
- B. Providing their own Aubsistence
 - 1. When guerrillas first get going, since they are constituted by

government order, the government should tell them to provide for themselves, being responsible to supplement at any time. Especially should the main body, who champion the people's guerrillas, provide for themselves and not trouble the inhabitants. This is all the more the case in areas long occupied by the enemy.

- 2. Guerrillas operating in sparsely settled country, or where political work is not yet fully prevalent, should adopt a self-sustaining procedure, inasmuch as what they themselves need must be provided by themselves, since it cannot be obtained from the enemy, and outside assistance cannot be found. In distant and secret localities there should be hidden eaches of food, arms, ammunition and health materials, for supplementing as needed.
- 3. For supplying guarrillas with ammunition, dependable makers and repairers of weapons should be sought for in the base areas, to set up in relatively safe and strong places repair shops for weapons and plants for making munitions as part of the solf-sustaining program.
- 4. Open up secret channels for buying arms and ammunition for enemy and puppet troops and from foreign purveyors of such goods, using the method of amuguling in disguise to transport secretly to guerrilla bases, in the endeavor that as far as possible, the guerrillas will never lack ammunition.
- C. Gotting Grain from the Themy.

When guerrilla warfare has expanded, and the numbers increased, and there is frequent extension to a distance of several hundred <u>li</u>, and circling of the enemy for several days or tens of days; or when enemy lines,



then the supply of food and munitiens must come from the enemy. This method of supply, while very unreliable is still very profitable.

- 1. By a planned movement, attack enemy food depots; or intercept enemy transport squade to seize food, ammunition, weapons, clothing, and other military supplies.
- 2. Carry a good supply of enemy and puppet bankmotes, to use at any time for merchants or spies to purchase food or munitions.
- 3. Confiscate the property of traitors who are hostile to guerrillas, and like-minded stingy rich; also of rich squires and big merchants who lack national feeling. If forces are strong, capture a city and seize enemy stations, depots, banks, etc., then proclaim it far and wide.

Section 2. Methods of Supply

A. Carrying on the Person

The largest amount that can be carried in this way is nine days!

supply. But for an army on the march, equipped for battle, the maximum is not to be over two days! ration. If knapsacks or saddle-bags are used, the maximum is three days! ration; more than that affects marching and fighting.

Personally carried rations had best be dry grain light and compact, and nourishing. Guard against mold and moisture; such rations should be used only when absolutely necessary. Food not carried personally can be transported in carts or on pack animals.

Personally carried rifle rounds should be not more than 100 per man and four grenades is the standard; hand and light machine guns, 500 rounds; heavy, 1,000; light mortars, 50 shots; explosive shells, half a section.

B. Supply Troops

Supply of guerrillas, besides what each man carries, should be done by a supply unit, carrying food beyond a five-day amount, and munitions beyond a two-day amount. A detachment should set up a separate supply company.

Marching and camping supply units, when there is no enemy action, may follow behind the guerrillas and camp in the same spot; but when contact with the enemy is possible, they follow at a distance of rive kilometers, or proceed by a parallel route far from enemy lines; the same is true while camping, If going through enemy-patrolled territory, the supply band should choose concealed places along the road for stopping when called for, awaiting orders to procood, and keep at least five kilometers from the main body; the same in camping. Night travel is preferable.

Supply by a supply unit, should be not morely of goods obtained, but should include proparing to make other supplies available. When supply is scarce and distribution cannot be made to all, select the fighters and the husky helpers for first priority.

C. Secret Supply Depots

When guerrillas are fighting and the action extends behind enemy lines, and the time is very long, there should be set up supply depots in secret places so that expenditure in guerrilla fighting, especially of munition, can be replenished in time.

The location of a supply depot must be concealed and secret, not readily discovered by the enemy; and yet it should be plainly marked so as to give clear indication to the guerrillas. Ordinarily it may be in a ravine, forest, cave, river bed, or in the home of a reliable citizen.

It should not be more than two days! march from the main guerrilla body.

A supply depot is a secret place set up in guerrilla territory, the terminus of transport from bases or distant points. The supply band of the guerrillas goes there to resupply. Sometimes men should be sent by night directly to bring supplies to the guerrilla hideout.

A guerrilla transport is sent out from the base; as a rule, it is made up of ordinary people. The number is determined by the amount of the lead. But the cadres, such as transport and other unit leaders, should have a definite structure; this is specially true of the main guerrilla force. As to people's guerrillas doing transport, definite persons should be early appointed to take responsibility.

Transport cadres should carry small arms, while the enlisted mon may do without; no convoy need go along; if going through encmy patrolled sections, they can disguise and break up; or stop and hide outside enemy lines, later reporting to main force to arrange secret and separate transport.

Chapter 20: Guerrilla Health.

Health materials and personnel for guerrillas usually cannot be as good and complete as for regulars; and lacking a secure broad rear area, a guerrilla rarely gots adequate hospitalization. So health measures for guerrillas are hard to carry out. However, to avoid increasing the sicklist, lessen the sufferings of wounded, so as to maintain fighting-strength, means that care must be taken for health as a problem that cannot be neglected. In the midst of extreme difficulties, ways must be found to remedy the situation.

Such ways lie along the line of keeping fit and exercising care as to medicines.

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Section 1. Attention to Health in Ordinary Times

- 1. A guerrilla leader should see to it that his men are supplied promptly with food and clothing, to avoid harm from hunger and cold; also he should stress cleanliness and keeping fit, especially in extreme heat and cold.
- 2. Urge the men to bathe, to wash and charge their garments; and all the more after marching or fighting to wash their feet in warm water.
- 3. Frevent summer cholera, vomiting and purging, ulcers and other contagious ailments by special attention to cleanliness and wholesomeness of food and drink. Let there be mutual care and exhortation among the men, to forbid drinking cold water or eating cold special food or anything unwholesome. When contagious diseases appear, isolate the patients at once.
- h. Use every effort, in ordinary times, to find personnel skilled in drugs, to follow the troops as they move, and administer preventive injections as needed. Physicians should be given the best consideration, or employed at very good pay.

Section 2. Care of Health during Fighting.

- 1. Bundage kit: This kit is carried by each one for binding younds.
- 2. Bandage station and assembling point for lightly wounded: Set up a bandage station and designate an assembling point for lightly wounded; then from bandage station remove wounded to concealed forward hospital.
- 3. Forward hospital: After forward concealed hospital has received sick, they are classified, the light cases being kept, the heavy being sont to a rear base hospital.
- h. Rear hospital: Guerrillas should contrive to set up a rear hospital at the outskirts of their base, more than three days! journey,

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in a very secluded spot, so that sick and wounded may have a relatively safe place in which to recuperate quietly. The guerrilla band should strive to have the equipment of this rear hospital very complete, that the sick and wounded may keep up in future their fighting spirit, quickly recover, and return to their units to fight.

5. Delegated Treatment: When guerrillas are intensely occupied with the enemy, they often find it impossible to give proper healing and nursing to sick and wounded, through tack of time and medicines. Under such conditions, they should commit their sick and wounded to a reliable local hospital for deputized treatment, or keep them in a home that is loyal to the guerrillas, to pose as relatives for the purpose of healing. Nurses should be given needed money. Deliberate leakage of news should meet with terrible revenge.

Chapter 21. Querrilla Bases

Section 1. The Meaning of Guerrilla Base

For the purpose of getting rest, re-grouping, replenishing, training, storing necessary munitions and food for developing and extending guarrilla warfare, and getting hold of persons and goods from occupied areas, the guerrillas should have a piece of ground adequate for their activities, to be used as base. It is not only for guerrillas who have long been active outside, to retreat to and hide in, for the rest and replenishment; but even for guerrillas under tense circumstances, meeting pressure or encirclement by the enemy, who can separate and secretly retire to the base for cover. It can be used as a point to retreat to or advance from. Whether the base is a good one or not, has considerable bearing on the

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guorrillas! endurance, ability to operate, and their own growth and empansion.

Really the gwerrillas, constantly in an atmosphere of fierce fighting, and exposed to all kinds of weather, must have a time and place for rest; else they not only fail to develop and are unable to deliver fierce attacks on the enemy, but they themselves become fatigued and are destroyed. So the setting up of bases becomes the very foundation of the guerrillas having peace and life. So bases must be set up except in fighting areas, and sometimes even there.

Section 2. Requirements for a Base.

- 1. Terrain Protection: This must be steep ridges, wide forests, complicated takes, involved readways, not lending themselves to enemy encirclement or attack, and suitable for us to hold a long time. If the guerrillas are few, and their operating area small, the base could well be located deep in the forest in huts surrounded by fences in lake country, in temples and caves in the mountains, independent villages, isolated healets and thatched buildings is a big forest; or on a broad waste plain, distant and sparsely settled.
- 2. Military Protection: Each guerrilla band should have two or more bases, not be satisfied with just one; and as a rule one and another should be used in turn. Also its grain house, munitions dump, and rear hospital should be at a distance from each other, lest when one is attacked the others become involved. And among these places, the men need not be continually going back and forth lest they be observed. Ever important pass should be guarded by 5-10 sentinels for warning and protection.

If the base has been discovered by the enemy, or they have prepared to attack it, do not wait for that, but at once plan a secret withdrawal.

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The location of thenew base should be kept an absolute sccret, even from those who are most loyal to the guerrillas, unless they have a direct relation to the new base.

3. Popular Support: A person in a guerrilla base should, just as being a member of a rescue group, receive at least the local people's sympathy and support. Therefore within the base precinets, all sorts of popular patriotic and resistance groups should be set up, with whom to maintain close liaison. If a guerrilla base gets complete support from the populace, it has already a full measure of support. As to the terrain being bad or not becomes new a monor question. Here lies the meaning of the pharse: "Faborable ground is not the equivalent of helpful people".

To gain the above named objectives, guerrillas should do active propaganda work among the inhabitants near the base, arousing popular national feeling and a patriotic attitude; and causing them to understand enemy oppression and cruelty so as to stir up a mood of resistance and bringing active sympathy and help for the guerrillas. When circumstances permit, guerrilla political workers should organize and train the populace, uniting them around the base, for purposes of production and warning.

h. Precautionsagainst the Encmy: Among the inhabitants, evil elements and traitors who are hostile to the guerrillas should be fully rooted out, and enemy scouts should be strictly prevented from slipping into the base; if discovered, let them be severely eliminated. Also, to guard against unexpected attack and derangement, the guerrillas should set up a good detective net among the people all around: patrols, observers, scouts, ambush guards, etc.

The closer the relations between guerrillas and people, the more supporters among the latter; communications liaison will be the more

quick and accurate; the guerrilla base can be more concealed and secure; the enemy desire to surround, attack and destroy the guerrillas will meet more and more difficulty.

Section 3. Camouflage of Guerrilla Bases.

- ahould be hidden to avoid detection. Within the limits of possibility, let the read lead to a strip which the enemy cannot know, following natural contour, so it is naturally hidden; such as having the read center line lead into a piece of woods, so as not to be discovered by the enemy. Camouflage the read by whatever materials can be found. Extend the read's beginning and end to a mecessary distant place, to connect with other reads, to lure the enemy's attention elsewhere.

3. Tracks of non horses or carts, while scarcely discernible, are ret hard to conceal on enemy air photographs. Hence in the stronghold or near it, roads suitable for camouflage should be designated for our convenience in travel; as to travel other than on the roads, strictly forbid it, lest the enemy discover new tracks.

Section 4. Fighting at a Base

- 1. Encirclement Attack. When the enemy attacks and before encirclement is completed, then with daring fierce attack try to evercome them piecemeal. Be sure to use noise here and action there, visible attack and feigned movement, in order to scatter the enemy's main strength. Also arouse the populace to join in the outskirts fighting and smash the enemy plans for encirclement attack, so as to preserve the security of our base.
- 2. Holding the Center. If attack against encirclement does not succeed, and the enemy breaks in with large forces, hoping to destroy our base then use terrain, carthworks, and popular help and fight as in the open country, focussing forces on holding the passes, awaiting the outer defenders or friendly troops from other guerrilla areas to make a counter-attack. If the enemy force is not too large, then await till it first comes, or till a weak point is revealed; then suddenly counter-attack, giving him a fright so that he leaves the encirclement and retires.

If at the beginning of the fight, the guerrilla base is fiercely attacked by a strong enemy force, the guerrilla leader should collect his men, resolutely and boldly break through the encirclement, and operate elsewhere until enemy pressure slackens, and they can return to the base. But a base that is liable to strong enemy attack should early find a way

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to conceal its valuables, its sick and wounded, so the enemy will not have a spider thread or herse's footprint as trace. Still more should the women and children in the area be removed well in advance, thus leaving an excellent impression on dwellers near the base.

4. Dispersal. When the guerrilla base is in straits, take the method of "dispersal", by which each one conceals himself; but this plan should not be lightly used. For guerrillas mostly come from peasant homes, have not been long trained to a soldier's life; and the idea of the group surviving or porishing together is of course not strong in them. If, before the enemy has made strong encircling attack, the men are disbanded each one to conceal himself, they will be hard to collect again. Also, enemy troops will search the houses, traitors will inform, the countryside will be rangacked, and the scattered guerrillas will have lost all their fighting power, and most will perish. So the tactics of "dispersal", whether in theory or in practice, must be used by guarrillas only in the direct extremity; and this is the more true when the base is involved.

Section 5. Education at a Base

Recause guerrillas are ordinarily engaged in mobile operations, generally they cannot have full training in skills and discipline; this fact has no little bearing on success in battle and ability to kill the enemy. Therefore a guerrilla band should set up at its base brief training classes in skills and officers' research groups to supplement deficiencies in training. Also there should be attention to education for production, especially for theneighboring populace; and people's guerrilla cadres should give particular attention to education for production, in the interest of the base being self-sustaining. This in order that guerrilla area

people when not fighting can be producing and when not producing can be fighting.

Section 6. Spy Reports at a Base

Important guerrilla bases should have a spy report office to take care of such reports, direct spy activities, compile and correct reports obtained, etc. And each guerrilla band and the directing headquarters for each district should set up a branch spy report office, and the spics under each branch office set up squads as area and duties demand. Each squad leader should be the best spy in the squad.

Therefore all spice should possess, in addition to good apy sense, suitable skill in controlling all types of spy activities; that is, not only be adopt at office work (handling spy reports) but also well-versed in field work (actual spying)

Desidos, in the case of apy personnel, it is much to be desired that they have full military and ordinary education, and some special knowledge. Also they should have devotion and putience, and be able to preserve secrets under any and all circumstances.

A. Principles of Spy Report Planning.

In order that spy report work may go on uninterruptedly in an orderly fashion, the guerrilla high command spy report office must make plans suitable to the needs of guorrilla fighting, so that all spics may have common standards of offort. Here are some chief features:

- 1. Each place should send an important cadre to make spot investigations, and appoint spies or counter-spies to set up a spy not.
- 2. They should find out what their duty is, and what they should note chiefly, in the actual war situation, and when their task should be done.

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- 3. In order to have all problems properly related, "Regulations Governing Dpy Work" should be adopted, for each spy to follow.
- 4. Each spy should decide on a plan for fulfilling his duty in accord with the task given him, and circumstances at the time.
- 5. To improve efficiency of apy work, and convenience of directing its operations, each apy office may hold conferences at suitable time and place, having each junior spy tell his experiences and the conditions under which he operated; afterwards the leaders will correct errors and give instruction for carrying out new tasks.

B. Setting up a Spy Net

Spy reporting must be well organized, as only thus can it meet the urgent needs in strategy and tactics. So there should be in ordinary times at the base clear and strict plans for its being organized into a system.

Guerrilla opy reporting should be organized ahead of time in each base of the guerrillae before it falls into enemy hands. If the not is set up only after enemy occupation, the expansion of its work will of course be more difficult.

A spy not should be built up for the whole operating region according to an overall plan, by leaders at the guerrilla base or by the leaders of the spy base at forward headquartors. Later, according to the priorities decided on for the various districts, and their importance the plan will be carried out, in order, for each section and for each direction.

A spy not should be secretly set up before guerrilla warfare starts. No matter whether the area has taken on war conditions or not, or has come under enemy control, it is very important that the flow of spy

intelligence never be interrupted.

C. Use of Upies

Since guerrilla spying covers a wide scope, spy duties are numerous. In choosing a spy, first see whether his personality is suitable for spy work. If there is to be penetration of high ranks in the bogus structure, it must be done by one from the better strata of society; for spying for important military matters, choose special personnel with high military education. If it is morely to find out the number of men in the enemy force, artillery points, etc., use a local villager or peddler for good rosults.

Therefore in sceking for satisfactory results in spying, every type of occupation may be screened to get spies.

- 1. Analifications for being a spy: these are not easy to define, for the conditions in which he works have unpredictable elements; so they are predicated upon his motives for work and his degree of success in past efforts. Those who undertake this work of their own volition, may be called voluntary spies; those forced into it, compulsory spies. The motives for this service may be classified as follows:
 - a. Patriotism. This moves government workers, and loyal citizens, who wish to see their native country survive. They are very reliable. Spy offices should never restrict thom.
 - b. Desire for gain. Such work solely for money. They should not be hired indiscriminately. Spy offices should restrict them, and pay them according to efficiency in reporting.
 - c. Spying as profession. Such are rich in experience, and what they do comports with their disposition; so their work generall y is

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efficient; but care must always be exercised lest they become counterspice.

- 2. Talents of a Spy: A good spy must be loyal, careful, alert, well-informed, brave, versatile; and he should have a thorough knowledge of the local dialect, habits of the people, local sensibilities, etc.; in addition, he must be able to make decisions and be fearless in trouble; otherwise he cannot perform his duty. As to a spy's employing helpers, he should exercise much care. If picking a female spy, besides her having patience and nimbleness, she should be pretty and clever, personable and alluring.
- 3. Employing of Spies: If a guerrilla band wishes to recruit spies this must be done by the spy office of the highest guerrilla command.

If you wish to get critical information, you must recruit spies who can get close to sources of information, for only such will be able to help. Then necessary, in order to get important material, even bribe high officials with a large amount of money. In getting such spies, see that their position and temperament tally with the task we give them.

these who would deceive or take advantage; so the utmost care must be used, to find out whether they have been spies before, If they really are firm patriots, and reliable, have them fill the following type form, and then check to see if what they have written is true. Name: other appellation; age; nationality; residence; education; previous activities; notables acquainted within puppet structure or enemy nation; familiar with what countries and languages; versed in conditions of what localities; connected with secret operatives in what places; motives for being spy; references; guarantors; occupation and residence of relatives.

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Investigation of these items should be done secretly, and each item verified. If results are satisfactory, then the party may be employed. He should be given guidance and help.

After spies are employed, their meeting places should be very secret. Mutual contacting should be kept secret. If a spy meets a supervisor on a road or in large building, where many people are, there must be no calling to each other or sign of emotion.

D. Vse of Counter-spies

1. In using enemy counter-spies, if these are loyal, trusted, and trained, the enemy will lay great store by their reports; so when we have discovered such, we should deliberately make false plans to ensure that after they report, the enemy will hit upon our plans.

If we deliberately accuse one of our faithful spics and lock him up, and after his release give him poor treatment, so that he fears for his livelihood, and the one punished also shows grief and inertia, and a number of times in a natural way lets slip to the enemy counterspy that he has the idea of going over to the enemy, then the enemy counterspy will report this to the enemy, and when the enemy receive him as a worker, we can then order him to do counter espionage. And if we deliberately create rumors, announcing that we have formed plans to attack the enemy by a certain road, and purposely feint, as if such were really the case; then if enemy scouts tell the enemy so, he will believe it to be true; meanwhile we redcuble preparations for making a strong attack by a road opposite to that of which the enemy has information, we should win a grand victory.

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To sum up: after enemy counter-spies have been discovered by us, we should quietly watch them, not let them know the true facts, but fabricate news and plans, so that after they make their report, the enemy will fall into the net. When a counter-spy known that he has been discovered, he should be put to death at once, lest he run away.

2. In using our spies:

a. Enter puppet organizations, study their structure, economy, and forms of activity: for example, the scheme of their organization, history of leaders, procedure in admitting traitors, distribution, under what enemy secret agency control, sources of funds, financial condition and forms of activity, recent plans and desires, internal factions and dissensions, etc.

b. As to traitors in puppet organization, stir up discord, arouse suspicion, create scrambs s for power and division of strength.

c. Find a way into enemy spy organizations, and besides getting genuine information to pass on at once to us so we can take countermeasures; also use counter-spy plans, to create rumors, so that they, on false information, will make wrong plans.

Section 7. Moonomy of a Base

Economy has great bearing on the growth of a guerrilla band.

Military tactics says: "soldiers perish without food." To be supplied with food and shelter comes before being supplied with soldiers. All social activities without economic foundation are inert and sooner or later fail. Especially in guerrilla warfare behind enough lines, the enemy will try by every means to destroy us, and economic blockade is one of the chief methods they take. Of course if the guerrillas can sustain

a force, they can break through the blockade; in order to sustain a force adequate for that means at least that the bases in guerrilla territory must, beforehand, have economic resources with which to sustain such a force.

The importance of base economy is just that. But to meet such a need requires first the ability to produce the goods needed, and secondly, sources for supplying such needs; and thirdly, if the first two are not enough to meet economic needs, then the principle of "Sacrifice" the lesser to supplement the most urgent" must be invoked.

- 1. How can we produce the needed goods? Increase production in guarrilla areas, strongly push household handicrafts, promote production cooperatives, have the whole non-combatant population making weapons and war goods. When farmers are most busy reduce guarrilla fighting as far as possible, to help with agriculture. Apportion whosly to field and factory so that labor and raw materials and manufactured goods are well balanced. Marnestly reduce expenditure, increase production.
- 2. Sources of base economy, especially money and weapons, should be supplied from the government; if transport is interrupted, use planes or other secret ways for this purpose; also try to get local supplies. Give special attention to such matters as reform of local finance and taxation, contributions by the rich and well-to-do business men, control of heavy industry, management of grain, cloth, oil and salt. To sum up: base economy should seek to be self-sustaining. As to getting grain from the enemy, that can be done in areas where guerrillas are active; at a central base, not only is there a limit to what is gotten, but transport is difficult.

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3. Supposing that the above-named plans cannot be put into effect, or not adequately, then by the principle of priority stated above, there must be a compulsory collection and distribution; whether it be of grain and animals, clothing and utensils, and all private products, machines, tools, capital land, whatever can fill the most urgent needs at the front in the way of resistance, all will be taken over for military use, collected at the base and apportioned out for urgent needs. The living standard of non-combatants must of course be sacrificed; but it must be so in order to strengthen the will to resist and seize the victory. A brave general kills his wife to maintain his men; a starving people cat their own children. In the European war, both Germans and French sent grain and meat forward to the soldiers, leaving bran for the civilians. This is priority.

Section 8. Government at a Base.

Guerrilla warfare is essentially the highest form of political struggle in an occupied area. The duty of a guerrilla band is not merely to gain outstanding victory by military means, but still more a thoroughgoing attack in the realm of mind and heart, by a political struggle scattering the seed of national revolutionary struggle. So a guerrilla band ought to intensify its own political education and strengthen the will to fight in its own troops, and expand their national and racial feeling, firing the enthusiasm of both officers and men for the conflict; on the other hand, it should foster its propaganda among the people and arouse guerrilla fighting, building a large revolutionary mass structure, overthrowing the authority of traitors and puppets, smashing enemy political aggression, thus will our guerrilla bases be lifted up in the hearts of all our people.

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Hence the political activity of guerrillas include: (1) Toward ourselves, strengthening the soldiers' political consciousness and building a self-conscious discipline; (2) Toward the people, earnest propaganda, organizing, arming, arousing widespread guerrilla warfare; (3) Toward the enemy, by casting doubt and inflaming division, trying to break up the army of enemy and puppets that is invading our territory. The completing of these three great tasks demands mutual assistance; especially must the guerrillas! own political structure be healthy. Consequently, a political foundation is required at a guerrilla base.

A. The Political Core of a Base

In a guarrilla base the political organization should be the center, and indeed a political core, uniting officers and men, raising their knowledge is the highest organ for setting up political guidance and training. And it should send out political agents from each guerrilla band, to develop a strong people, united in revolutionary sacrifice. The brave, awakened elements among the junior cadres of a guerrilla band are the core of a political organization; and to scatter this core throughout the guerrilla band and guerrilla erea is to stimulate model functioning and will lead other guerrilla band members to active loyal struggling.

B. Political Indoctrination among the Troops.

Among the troops there should be constant political teaching, to impregnate them with political knowledge, and raise their cultural level. Therefore the propaganda bureau of a detachment or column should institute a committee on political education, gathering the political guides and propagandists, for regular discussions, fixing of educational methods, materials, and propaganda themes. 228 CONFIDENTIAL

For political propagandists and secret agents, choose from among the troops the finest and purest, to receive briefing from the political commissars, while the propagandists also receive instruction in the use of materials.

Duties of propagandists: Internally, to use firm political feelings for winning over any among the troops who engage in incorrect talk; externally, to establish good relations between army and people, to win popular sympathy, and proclaim guerrilla objectives and activities.

Duties of secret agents: Internally, to keep watch secretly over the thoughts of officers and men, to prevent infiltration and activity among the troops by traitors and reactionaries, and to forestall desortion by band members; externally, to find out the leanings of the populace towards us, and activities of traitors and reactionaries among the people. Secret agents must maintain absolute secrecy, never disclosing anything. As soon as discovered, they should be replaced by others.

C. Popular Movements at a Guerrilla Base

In enemy-occupied territory, they often use organizations of traitor power, to stupefy the people and proctaim their virtuous intentions; or they use pressure and allurement to make our people aid them in capturing victims. Therefore guerrillas before setting up bases in occupied territory, should use all methods of secret propaganda, through printed matter, detectives, etc., to make known the enemy's cruel injurious conduct, and to arouse the people's feelings of hostility and fight, to struggle for the re-assumption of political power. As soon as that is obtained, make widespread propagamia, and rural purging, to get rid of all traitors and villains.

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There is a syming: "When the nest is overturned there are no whole eggs." A national revolutionary struggle involves all the able-bodied in the land; all in the war areas should be led to join the guerrillas and thus participate directly into the war; others, old and infirm, women and children, should do their utmost to aid the guerrillas, by finding out enemy conditions, relaying news, transporting, first-aid, keeping watch, secuting, taking nessages, spying, laboring, cheering the workers, patrolling, rooting out traitors, etc., to make it a genuine "people's war".

Honce before guerrillas set up bases, they should do hard political work; and when bases are set up, finish as soon as possible political instruction of the people, so the guerrilla base may have the firmest possible foundation.

D. Propaganda among the Peoplo.

Propaganda is the first step in organizing a populace; it must be done to complete the tasks outlined above. It is especially important to the explaining of the true meaning of the national struggle, and strengthening faith in victory in the war of resistance.

1. Explaining the true meaning of the national struggle. To restore the Republic, civil wars go on coasolessly. The people are so habituated to war that neither victory or defeat affect their security of life or manner of living. Even in this life and death national struggle they have an attitude of indifference, as if they personally were not involved in which side wins. Do they know that in the past civil wars, the reason the people were not strongly affected, was because the war was within one nation, and both sides had the same objective, — to gain power —;

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political vision, and expression of conviction, had at first not motive for injuring the people's life, and still less of destroying the nation. So when the fight was over, the people had not suffered greatly, and the issue of the war had only a slight bearing for them. But now our war of resistance against Japan, is a decisive battle for our nation's survival. Guerrillas should first heighten the sense of national apprehension. The chief point is to explain that this is an anti-aggression war by an oppressed people, entirely different in meaning from past internal revolutionary struggles. We must expound the real meaning of racial and national freedom and independence, clarify the concept of race and nation; and recount the facts about the barbarous enemy bombing and murdering in our land, in order to inflame national indignation and hasten the awakening, uniting, and fighting of our entire people. Therefore in seeking racial survival and national independence, the whole nation must sincerely and with one mind rise up and resist.

We must realize that national and individual survival are closely built together, and that the national government is the contralized force for protecting the life and property of all the people; without government there is no nation, and without the nation, no individual. Ancient and modern tragic examples of perished nations warn us over and over to correct our former mistaken notions about there being no race, no nation, and to visualize clearly each one's bounden duty to race and nation; to persuade and arouse each one to take part in the national struggle for survival. And when the enemy have all been driven out, then and then only can individual life and property be basically assured.

2. Strengthening faith in victory in the war of resistance. Comparing our strength with that of the enemy, for the people to see the assets and CONFIDENTIAL 23/

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liabilities of both sides, thus we point out our future victory in resisting. Japan is an imperialist nation founded on industry, depending on supplies from abroad and on foreign markets for expert. Our country is not merely the source of raw materials for her, but still more her greatest market for nanufactured goods.

This invasion by the enemy not only cuts off a large part of her industrial raw materials, but also the largest cutlet for her goods, and is really a case of suicidal short-sightedness on the part of the dwarfs; for other countries, because of their competition in China in normal times, will, in case Japan gains the advantage in this war, also boycott Japanese goods and break off commercial relations, which will be enough to end Japan's industry. So while Japan wants a quick decision to solve her economic crisis, she will not be able to have it.

On the contrary, ours is an industrially backward country; in normal times, owing to the Open Door, there is a large excess of imports. But in warting, due to the blockade, large importation of foreign goods has been stopped; and it is only necessary to use existing handicrafts and farm-goods to relieve the situation and mark time while being self-sustaining. So, just speaking of economics alone, there is enough to adjudge that the enemy will suffer the fate of final defeat.

Other factors such as his financial stringency, poverty of munitions resources, excessive military expenditure, difficulty of supply, clashes in government, popular revolt, and the uprising of national revolutionary movements among other races, and the international situation unfavorable for Japan are further advantageous conditions for our victory in the war of resistance. If all our fellow-countrymen, in high or obscure positions, can be united in mind and heart to make a united widespread guerrilla war, Japan's imperialist war will result in her defeat, and our resistance will succeed.

PART VIII

STARTING, TRAINING, AND DEMANDS

Chapter 22: Starting of Guerrilla Marfare

depends chiefly on first setting up a large main band to start extensive guerrilla bands of the people. These people's guerrilla bands are most effective behind enemy lines or in the neighborhood of enemy invasion. Such organizations carry on their work directly under enemy observation, or under the regime of enemy puppets, namely traitors. The obstacles and thorns in such work can easily be imagined.

But we cannot be dismayed by observation or by hardships. All the more, in the face of enemy wiles of "central Chinese by Chinese", "keep war going by war", must we push vigorously, undermine rear puppet regimes, and start extensive puppet warfare, with thorough attacks. The chief axioms for starting are secreey and nimbleness.

The embryo forms of guerrilla forces at first are "hidden groups" concealed among the people. When those have grown to sufficient membership, have a minimum of weapons, and completed the most rudimentary military training, then they can collect their strength for starting action. So when first organized, they must be extremely secret; their mothods may be as follows: Action with cover, action without cover, re-grouping, and forced starting: these four.

Section 1. Action with Cover

when starting guerrilla warfare in protected regions, conjecture the enemy's direction and area of attack, and in normal times there should be organization and training; otherwise when already under pressure of a

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war crisis, you must under protection of government and army quickly send the main body of guerrillas (equipped with military, political, and secret service imoviedge) deep among the people and using both government orders and popular will, openly propagandiae and faithfully warn.

First persuade the majority of the people, except for a few unworthy squires who must be threatened and forced. The best way is to have the people enlist voluntarily. Then otrengthen the organization of existing groups among the people, such as labor unions, commercial associations, federated villages (rural folk), or Pac-chia structures, student unions, women's unions, etc., in the name of the war of resistance. From these then gather vigorous men, and weapons, for all sorts of people's guerrilla bands. If the place is spursely settled, and the people not organized as yet, stress propaganda, organize quickly, and along with this set up people's guerrillas.

When all types of people's guerrillas have been set up, -- peasant, labor, student, communications, etc. -- wait for the enemy to seize this area. Then have such bands remain in the area behind enemy lines. They are everywhere and the enomy cannot guard against them.

This method of starting, while absolutely public, yet must use the method of small secret bands, because of environmental conditions. Or a portion should remain secret, particularly the communications band which must always romain so, lest enomy spies and traitors find them out and their work be made harder.

The guerrilla main body, which undertakes to start people's guerrillas should operate along trunk railways, highways, waterways, in the important villages and towns, on a wide scale, in touch with local governments and friendly troops, mobilizing the people, entering their circles. Courier

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and scout troops should give them intelligence and military training, and initiate a scout and news net for detailed inquiry about the following: where are the enemy's indispensable roads? Where are bridges easy to destroy, and worth destroying? What is the construction of the target, and its weak points? What is the method of destruction? How are materials brought in? What buildings can be used by the enemy in the future? (here explosives should be placed beforehand). Where are wells and ponds on which the enemy must depend for drink? (to be filled up or poisoned). Reports should be made in detail, and careful preparations made, to achieve satisfactory fulfilment when demanded.

Again, when the enemy is about to capture a place, and our troops are preparing to withdraw, at this juncture we should secretly bury weapons and explosives, prepare money and food, and wholly disperse guerrillas and eadres, to hide among the people. As soon as the enemy arrives, and you observe that his strength is scattered, and he is off guard, then start estivities or collect information to give to regulars, or break up communications so they are useless to the enemy. If the enemy's strength is concentrated, and he is alert, go into hiding and await your chance, is concentrated, and he is alert, go into hiding and await your chance. Everything should be decided by then imble functioning of the leader at the time.

when the enemy front line is hard pressed, his rear guard is neglected; or when transport is heavy, he is less alert. When we counterattack; at that very moment our armed men should spring up in numbers, focus our resources, set in motion all the armed populace, for quick, wide action and fight. This way of setting in motion is much easier than when without cover, and preparation can be complete. If organization can be made very early, and activities shifted, undiscovered by the enemy, results

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will be yet larger.

Section 2. Action without cover

In starting guerrillas in unprotected regions, send a number of men from the main body, who have military, political and intelligence skills, to be hidden beforehand in the enemy rear, or to clip in when the enemy is occupying an area for the purpose of organizing emeng our people anall guarrilla bands. Those responsible for doing so should gather from among the people a number of persons who are awake, eager, strong, and daring to become the first organized guerrilla core. Out of this core set up secret small bands, of five to ten persons. If enemy vigilance is active, let the bands be smaller, of from three to five. Each band has a leader, directly under the highest secret group of the main band.

In each area, wait until there are many small bands and a fair number of mon have been collected, armed and trained (with simple knowledge such as aiming a gun), and fairly well prepared. Then select a secret rendezvous that can be concealed (cave in the forest; isolated village; building in a big city). Agree on a time for meeting, and give instructions as to the approaches. Appoint scouts and spics to look out and warm. After all the men have arrived, they can be lectured to and formed into a guerrilla band. The best way to select a leader, and arrange layout of duties, is by popular election when that is possible. The chosen leader should at this time, with the utmost faithfulness and earnestness, announce strict discipline.

After the guerrilla band is formed, the leader should decide by actual needs and surrounding conditions what action should be taken or whether to disperse and continue hiding. But as soon as objectives and tasks are settled, the leader should make careful plans and all-round

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preparation for initiating the first tentative try at disturbing or confusing the enemy. For this first clash, do not choose a task over-large only choose an objective that is easily accomplished. For, the success of the first attempt will increase the men's self-confidence and bravery and inspire faith and warm hope in the people. If the task is too big and failure should result, the men's fighting spirit would be dampened, the people's faith would be reduced, and starting again would not be easy.

What has been said above about the way to start guerrillas secretly, is also a basic principle for organizing guerrillas behind enomy lines, From few to many, small to large, secret small groups to a large strong band, from secret gatherings to open activities, by spreading and growing, in a short time widespread guerrilla warfare can be started behind enomy lines. But one thing must be understood, namely that the prosecution of this work, despite difficulties, if done with secrecy and nimbleness, cleverness of fuction, boldness and care, quick adaptability, no matter how carefully guarded the enemy, how well deployed his scouts and traitors, there is absolutely nothing that cannot be started. Hence in areas long controlled by the enemy, such as Jehol, Hoilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning, etc., there is both possibility and necessity of organizing among the people from time to time. In areas not long occupied by the enemy, progress is easier.

Section 3. Regrouping

Armed forces scattered among the people include the Big Sword Society, Red Spear Society and other societies and disbanded soldiers. The societies have long existed as public or semi-public groups in large number. These armed forces are in general not targets of enemy attack, but rather what the enemy wishes to deceive and utilize. So we should

actively use them, and not despise and fail to use them because they cherish superstitious ideas, foudal thinking, and lack national and racial consciousness. We must realize that such societies are really the most easily moved of the armed forces among the people, and also the easiest to become reactionary. If they are not absorbed, their reactionary strength will be very large as soon as they experience enemy bribing and alluring, traitors! incitment and employment.

To organize this armed strength among the people, the method of absorption may be used, very early making contacts with their leaders. Those who have this take of absorbing should know well these societies! dogmas, joining themsolves, and making a blood sworn bond with their leaders, a just band to defend the land. Dound by a feeling of knighterranty, for loyal service to the nation, with killing the enemy as motive; then aid them with arms and ammunition, train them in guerrilla tactics, fill them with nationalism, arouse racial consciousness, crystalize their purpose of killing the enemy, sharpen their skill at doing so.

First work on the sidelines doing joint observation then re-group, basically altering their original nature and manner, making them into a main guerrilla band. If they never accept commission and direction, then find a way to divest them of their arms, to destroy their lcaders, re-group or disband their men. Never let them be used by the enemy.

As to puppet troops and people's armed forces, fooled by the enemy and bought over by puppet organizations, many counter-spies should be sent to get in touch with them. When enemy overbearance and control become too heavy, enlighten them about the righteous cause, arouse them with pros and cons, help them with money and weapons, lead them to alter and come to the right. As to defeated, scattered soldiers, wrge them is to be 238 CONFIDENTIAL absorbed as main body guerrillas.

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Section 4. Forced Starting

The three chief methods of starting named above, are all effective methods of enlarging the guerrillas. But because of our people's low state of culture and inadequate knowledge of government, most people, whether in occupied or war regions, are indifferent to national advantage or racial consciousness. Each one has selfish narrow ideas, covets individual fleeting benefits, and for the sake of a few more breaths, willingly becomes a docile slave and does not even hasitate to be traiter, caring naught whether the whole nation, the glorious race, lives or dies, putting us descendants of the Yellow Amperor in eternal jeopardy.

Join in guarrilla warfare, we perhaps should create a great fear, giving them no false peace, as the only way to get them to move. Do not have a bit of woman's pity, just giving empty accurance for the moment, or fall into the evil plot of nourishing war by war. So in the occupied areas, do not hesitate to use the techniques of violence and terrorism, murdering the traitors, bullies, bad squires, never tetting them be used by the enemy and puppets. Still more, never tot the people living in a fool's paradise enjoy life and activity as usual. Preclude their running to enemy-held cities carrying their possessions with them; and strictly impress on the vigorous men in occupied areas that unless they join the guarrillas, they have no assurance of remaining alive.

The war manual says: "When you must die, then you live; when by good fortune you live, then you die". Guerrilla warfare is essentially a self-sacrificing warfare which an industrially backward people has to adopt for national defense, a suicidal war. Then how can it fail to adopt the methods of suicidal warfare? As regards the shameless cowards who

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wants to hang on to life, you can only arouse them by cutting off their livelihood. Let all these people know that failure to join the guerrillas merely hastons their end, and there will be none left. But when they join the guerrillas, then at last they can preserve their own lives, avoid insult to their wives and daughters, not lose their encestral glory, or forfeit the fragrance of their descendants.

Thus, no matter how weak, clinging to life and fearful of death the people, they can be stimulated to join up, be at the very forefront, volunteering without conscription, believing without being ordered, full of ennity, getting close without previous agreement, abstaining without effort, eager to get in first, risking danger to kill the enemy, taking oath without anxiety. This is the doctrine of "Finding life in the land of death, surviving in the place of extinction". With a people driven to doath, with no way of escape, the leaders can move them by the pros and cons, stir them up with enthusiasm, make clear the rewards and penalties, share both sweet and bitter. As a result of course, they will conquer the stupid enemy wherever they go.

As to war areas not yet occupied, the people are comatose in twilight torpor, and bosides political and cultural mobilization, awakening their national awareness and destroying their silly dream of a fool's paradise as docile people, you should use military organization, reconstituting their existing Pao-chia system, labor and peasant unions into people's guerrillas, by force if nocessary. Otherwise punish severely, killing without mercy, If not, you speak vainly of arousing. Over-indulgence nourishes traitors. And if you do not create an environment favorable for arousing (almost compelling, them in the case of these stupid, half-drugged people) not only

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can you not arouse them for national defense, but you will leave them behind for the enemy to use as tools to destroy our nation!

Indeed, this form of arousing by compulsion, while it is a nuisance to the people, is nevertheless tied in with the survival of the race and nation, and there must be left no trace of leniency. If you can make the government nearly perfect, the people will gladly follow it, and feel no annoyance; even if you do annoy them, you at least are not giving them over to the enemy. Really, annoying the people is annoying those who with a false sense of security shameless and willingly surrender to the enemy as docile folk. And it is traiterous help to the enemy if we hard over to them the human and material resources for the destruction of our nation.

Further, in building up troops for further resistance, only by arousing a people's army as a mass-movement of thousands and tens of thousands, can we at all times and places, supplement the regulars and help them in resisting the enemy to attain our aim of long-term attrition of the villans. Especially in the occupied regions, only a widespread arousing of the people, to do ubiquitous guarrilla work, will be adequate to smash the villains' plot to "Use Chinese to govern Chinese", "Use wars to keep mars going" and to grasp the guarantee of final victory in our nation's war of resistance.

Chapter 23. The Training of Guerrillas.

The formation of a guerrilla band is usually when hard pressed in war.

If in normal times they do not have suitable training, then in wartime a
limited time must be used for intensive training. There should be much
discussion after an actual battle, or theseeking of lessons during movement.

During a pause in the fighting each man should be given supplementary drill,
lest he have the spirit of sacrifice in vain and no skill in slaying the enemy.

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Those scientific sepects of training should be chesen which bear directly on the fighting such as putting on equipment, shooting, piercing, using terrain and ground objects, throwing grenades, night assaults, commando raids, etc. These should be taught before anything else. As to other scientific aspects, such as instruction in flighting, guerrilla tactics, anti-aircraft, anti-disease or poison measures, they should be taught whenever opportunity, such as a full in the fighting, permits. Mothodu and types of training are described below:

Section 1. Wethods of Training.

- 1. Tire. The time of guerrillae being trained on a drill-field should be reduced, and that in the field increased. Hight instruction should exceed that in the day. If possible, use each time the fighting stops, or any pause in the fighting, or the time of preparation before a battle. Let the leader or other cadres explain carefully from the experience gained in the past fighting, the cause of success or failure. But this sort of lecturing should be shortened to the minimum, to lessen the guerrillas! fatigue.
 - 2. Place. While the guerrillas still exist as secret small bands, the choice of their training place should be in a lonely house, or temple in the doep hills, or on a boat in mid-stream, or a high building or cellar in a city. When guerrillas are assembled and in movement, choose a forest or ravine or spacious home hear the camp, or a sequested shrine, or such like. Fields near a city, or space between homes, where people are numerous, will not do.
 - 3. Subjects. Of all the subjects for training, choose the simple and reject the complex, take the important points, choose the outlines,

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avoid rambling discussions, shun that which is time-wasting or unrealistic. Also such topics as are used should be related to movement needs and environmental fitness.

For example, "putting on equipment", should be divided into daytime equipping, might equipping, empty-handed equipping, armed equipping, winter equipping, and such headings. In summer it is not appropriate to teach vanter equipping; in the day teach daytime equipping; in the darkness of night practice night equipping, as occasion demands. The order of passing from empty-handed to armed equipping, from day equipping to night equipping, should be given attention. The one important thing is: in daytime seek apoed and good array, at night seek speed and silence. Stress the four chief points: Order, speed, simplicity, silence.

the Training of Cadres. As guerrillas increase in number, and bands swell, limitations of space and time make it hard for the whole band to gather at one spot for training. So select and draw together the high-class men and junior cadres, for special training; then arrange separate drill units for each band in camp; first develop cadres, then let the cadres instruct the men and load them in fighting. Such training can have the effectiveness of being concentrated under a single command.

The generalla high command should from time to time gather the officers of each unit (company commanders and above, and political guides, etc.) to study arts of guerrilla warfare, and compile codes and orders suited to guerrilla fighting, etc. Also practice instruction in fighting, directing fire, etc.

Careful study should be made of each fighting experience, the causes of success or failure, the lessons of experience. This is valuable material for officers' training. In each company or column (or re-grouped

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higher unit) there should be efficers' seminars. If ordinary teaching is not feasible, let there be seminar meetings now and then.

5. Training of Spies. Those of ordinary type can be trained in special classes; those with serious duties, or with special skills, should be trained in cells or individually. Training of individual spies should be done in a secret place. So in the area of one instructor there should be several secret hideouts, to accompdate returning spies and to be a training place for them. Thus since each spy does not know the location of his own hideout, enemy spies have no chance to counter-spy

Section 2. Training in Skills

basic subjects, solected because they meet the urgent needs of guerrillas. These are shooting, bayoneting, throwing grenades, use of terrain and ground objects, combat training, night training anti-air attack, anti-poison and use of explosives, spy work, secret messages, propaganda work, etc.

These may be outlined as follows:

1. Shooting. Guerrilla chances for shooting are very few, and supplying ammunition is difficult; so to gain accuracy of fire, and save munitions, each guerrilla must have skill in shooting. Hence in normal training he should practice all operations with a gun, including use of terrain.

Training in shooting with pistols and hand machine-guns should stress the various models and types of pistols commonly used by the enemy and in our country, and there should be practice in quick spontaneous shooting, in self-defense from sudden attack and in covering when making capture, in carrying concealed pistols and shooting under any and all crisis. 244

2. Bayoneting. Guerrillas depend on sudden assault as their one technique for attaining their objective, and sudden assault depends in the final analysis on close combat; hence the leader should teach his men how to use the different weapons they have, such as swords, spears, bayonets, and give them constant practice with same.

In practicing maked steel combat, look for skilled hands at the native art, and teach them the rudiments of sword and spear handling; then set up in an empty plot some trees or bundles of straw in a row, as objects of practice killing, so that themen may do quick execution with one strock, right and left, up and down.

As to the art of stabbing to death, make up offigies of jute bags, or use trees in the woods, for targets of stabbing; practice jumping forward and backward, suddenly right, suddenly left, to make the action lively.

There should be special practice in shooting automatic pistols; effective results can be quickly obtained without aiming. And before executing a task of assassination, have the trainees shoot to death several criminals to avoid tense fear when the occasion arises

3. Grenades. These are easily supplied, because their manufacture is simple; so they make a capital weapon for guerrilla warfare. When the sphere of guerrilla operations is relatively large, guerrillas can plan to make them themselves. But familiarity with their use, range and accuracy of aim, are factors greatly affecting efficiency.

Therefore a guerrilla leader must teach his men all ways of throwing grenades, including the art of aiming well. For such teaching, balls of grenade weight may be made, or spherical stones of such weight used, and various ranges marked on a field or in the open country, 20 to 60 meters.

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First have the men throw for distance, then aim at straw figures placed front and back and on both sides. Contests can also be arranged.

- h. Using ground objects. Whether terrain and ground objects are good may be decided by whether they help fire-power or afferd cover, a matter needing much study. The important point is that besides having all action to fit the terrain and ground objects, nimbleness and speed, attention should be given to concealment from the enemy ahead and in the air, and to using cover from enemy searchlights at night and daytime observation. All action should suit the terrain and ground objects.
- 5. Combat training. This is based on action by regulars below battalion strength, such as dispersal and other actions by a minor unit; such as shooting and rushing, placing and choosing targets for LMG and LMG, cooperation with nearby units, essentials of fighting enomy cavalry guns and planes, handling of gas attack, use of reserves, defense of small units, making of fire not, quick throwing up of simple carthworks, building of forts, action and posting of sentinel forces, sending out of patrols, opportunity for counter-attack, times of pursuit and retreat and methods of same, etc.
- 6. Night training. Stress practice on the spot, develop habits of night seeing and hearing, how to march at night, how to determine direction and location, use of weapons, linking up with commends, recognizing slogans and other sounds, essentials of night searching, patrolling and fighting.
- 7. Anti-air attack and anti-poison. News and alarm of air attack among guerrillas, negative defense of moving and of stationed troops, negative defense while fighting, detection, recognition of poison, defense against poison.

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- 6. Secret message. Delivery over enemy occupied areas, electric code messages, secret messages of physic, and of chemical means, messaging by concealment and disguise, methods of deciphering.
- 9. Propaganda work. Explain the psychology of propaganda and its respective areas. For example, front-line and rear and enemy area propaganda, distinguish the methods, such as deductive, inductive, anti-counter propaganda, distinguish the types, such as printed, oral, disguised, etc.
- 10. Use of explosives. Kinds and recognition of explosives, nature of formulae and ways of testing; black powder; nitric cellulese and sweet oil; use of pieric acid and nitre combinations; ways of spot manufacture of simple explosives; also, carrying, disguisting, preserving, and using methods.
- 11. Spy work. Meaning and compiling of spy reports, their content, guidance and plans; choice and use of personnel; essentials of POW interrogation; interrogation of spies after a mission is accomplished; qualifications and placing of spies, employment and training of minor spies, forging of documents, disguising and capturing, meaning, functioning, and special requisites for counter-espionage, discovery and recognition of enemy spies, and points to note in counter-spying.

The subjects listed above, if they can be taught over a long period, in toto, in guerrilla territory, that is admirable; otherwise, a few or even just one subject can be taught intensively. Also, guerrilla service and fighting training should be given to all, so as to really set up common beliefs and united action in guerrilla warfare.

Section 3. Mental Training

In order that each element of a guerrilla band may be filled with

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hatred for the nation's public enemy so that the two cannot live under the same sky, develop the spirit of sacrifice in the nation's war of resistance, and be willing to water the flowers of national survival with their own blood, internal political work must be strengthened within the guerrilla band, to make firm their political confidence, foster their merals for fighting, and build them up as high-grade personalities in sacrifice for the national revolution, of their own accord executing orders thoroughly, and satisfactorily completing their task.

As to internal political work, guerrillas should be guided by their surroundings, size of group, conditions of fighting. Pay special head to their political and cultural level, using all ways, under all conditions, to keep it continually rising, eschewing all maintenance of status quo.

A. Internal Political Work.

- 1. Heighten the progressive view of life among officers and men, with a long look ahead, unitedly understanding the present shape and the future of this war, comparing our real strength with that of the enemy, and seeing political and economic conditions and the theoretical and actual prerequisites for our victory over the enemy. Raise to the utmost the personal qualities of the men, each man's alortness, so as to go forward and fight with a warm love of freedom and a fearless confidence of victory.
- 2. Build up the guerrillas! consciousness of military mores and discipline. In dealing with offenders be sure to use the persuasive educational method, leading the soldiers by political education. Go from the concrete to the abstract, from the intimate problems which the guerrilla understands to the overall problem of a national revolution, so that he will cherish racial and national welfare above all other considerations, and on his own initiative be willing to bear responsibility and observe

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discipline.

B. Methods of Political Work

- 1. Lecturing. Let the political morkers give political reports to officers and men, and recount the enemy's cruel deeds, to arouse animosity.
- 2. Research. Under leadership of political workers, carry on, in normal times, political discussions and debates; study enemy contradictions and ways of resisting him; strengthen political and discipline, etc., in order to raise the political and military level of the guerrillas and their acquaintance with guerrilla warfare.
- 3. Literature. Compile training materials; compose martial songs rich in stimulation of national sacrifice and killing of the enemy; publish ordinary newspapers and wall prints of guerrilla warfare and other daily edited material.
- h. Amusement. Querrillas usually live a life of tense fighting and movement. Constant travel, fighting and training, easily cause fatigue or repugnance; so all sorts of emusements should be encouraged.

To increase amusement in the army and relieve their drab life, start a club in each detachment or column; in each company start an amusement hall, where there will be provided recreational and athletic equipment, such as checkers, balls, music, radios; have an army newspaper, present plays, etc.

In each unit there should be a glee club, drama club, chess groups, ball teams, riding-shooting societies, speaking societies, and other amusement groups.

When having emusements at a station, if circumstances permit, let the local people take part, to strengthen good feeling and connections between guerrillas and populace.

The scope of psychological training is very wide, it can include all of daily life. But its practical content should emphasize the following:

- a. Nourish nationalism among the men, and acquaintance with the nation's war of liberation.
- b. Nourish faith in leaders and officers, feelings of reverence for revolutionary heroes.
- c. Nourish determination to kill the enemy and brave unyielding
- d. Hourish such beliefs as "Spirit transcerds matter", "Final victory will certainly be ours".
- c. Nourish the attitude of charing both blessings and disasters, to get unity in movement and ward off enemy propaganda to the contrary.

 Mental training of guerrillas should go on even in the midst of war.

 An order of lessons should be prepared, to go on in orderly fashion, with regular inspection. Shun rigid clas-room teaching. Best let education be a part of all conferences, discussions, conversations, or guerrilla lectures, to get the fullest results. If at the beginning of operations, several victories can be gained, then after this the fighting spirit will be high pitch and should be constantly encouraged.

at times surrounded by the enemy, with supplies and ammunition cut off and we are cold without clothes and hungry without food, we should not waver but rely on our faith that the spiritual overcomes the material, and by spiritual training we can overcome material difficulties. If by means of conversations, we do individual training and correct errors and constantly find out about each one's correct concepts, we may guard against the sprouting and growth of reactionary ideas.

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Section 4. Training in Military Discipling.

of guerrilla fighting strength; for guerrilla bands are mostly made up of scattered people who ordinarily experience but little group life. They are easer to trap and slay the enemy, but have no habit of observing discipline. This is their nature. But to make a firm guerrilla organization, to preserve spirit and fighting strength, there really has to be stricter discipline than that of regulars. First the meaning of discipline must be constantly explained to them, so they can observe it of their own accord; never like regulars, use threats to cow people, thus reducing the offectiveness of spontaneous observance. For guerrillas are mostly away from control, and are used in a dispersed way, and military discipline is helpless except as it is observed spontaneously.

Querrilla discipline can be treated under the two headings of living and fighting:

- 1. Discipline for living. In making firm the guerrilla organization, regulate the mon's activities, maintain military discipline and mores and especially preserve proper relations between guerrilla and people. For instance, trading should be on a fair basis, manners should be pleasant, borrowed articles returned, damages paid for injury, sexlicense and stealing strictly forbidden. All this is necessary discipline to keep good relations. It also decides whether the guerrillas will obtain popular support and help.
- 2. Discipline for fighting. The purpose is for officers and men, in time of battle, to be able to execute orders resolutely, with one mind, sacrificing to kill the enemy, so as to guarantee victory. So in normal times the habit of obeying orders and executing commands should be built

up.

3. Obeying orders in battle is the more important because only by so doing can there be united effort to gain victory and preserve the lives of all. Battle discipline also should be built on the foundation of spontaneity. But discipline for living includes the meaning of guidance and discussion; while discipline for fighting carries the demand for obeying and executing.

4. A guerrilla leader before exacting discipline, should explain over and over to his subordinates, with the utmost clarity, so that everyone understands fully. Except when unavoidable, never lightly impose severe punishment. And in administering discipline, take into consideration extenuating circumstances, and the man's level of awareness, as criteria for determining a sentence. This is what is meant by "In legislation severe, in application of the law, lenient".

Section 5 Rewards and Penalties should be: 1) publicly approved; 2) Clear-cut; 3) Swift; 4) "Using penalty for education." Avoid such a vil ways as letting feeling influence affairs, and being guided in response by favors and injuries. Therefore in the army have rewards to record merit, penalties for offense. To have order you must pass laws; if you want your laws to stand, you must have penalties. If when killing, the crowd is not resentful; when excusing, the crowd is not indignant: this is what is meant by "public approval". When administering the law, having written authority; when punishing, have evidence: this is what is meant by "clear-cut". Punishing without delay: rewarding without postponement: this is what is meant by "swift".

The chief components of a guerrilla band are peasants; most of them are accustomed to being warm and well-fed, and not used to organized living

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and discipline regime. At first they may have some driven by a memetary warm patriotism, very determined and brave. But if they meet environmental difficulties, or lose in battle, they may easily take to desertion. Hence if severe penalties must be used, a clear explanation should be given. Still more should there be in ordinary times, guidance ahead of time, to attain an absolute reduction in the applying of the penalty laws. This is what is meant by "using penalty for education".

As to newcomers in the band, since they have little military training, they are apt to transgress the following articles of military discipline.

So should be warned beforehand.

- 1. Ordinarily they do not know how to cherish and take care of their wompons, resulting in rust, injury, or loss of parts;
- 2. Then marching, they full out of rank, not observing march discipline;
- 3. When fighting, they cannot resolutely carry out orders; when assaulting, they cannot co-ordinate their actions; when the fighting is hot, they cannot hold on, and even slip away from the line of fire.
- 4. When a battle is lost, they recklessly start rumors, act on their own, and plunder.
- 5. When a battle is won, they search for prisoners' valuables as they please, or shoot prisoners at random.

For easily committed offenses named above, if dealt with as in the case of well-trained regulars, strict punishment would have to be administered. But in the case of guerrillas breaking such discipline, sometimes there is no intention of infraction, or it is impetuous action due to ignorance or selfish ideas. So when such infractions occur, let the leader use educational methods, giving the offending guerrilla a chance to repent and renovate

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himself. He should not arbitrarily severely administer a rigid law concerning punishment.

when guerrillas, in a spirit of brave sacrifice, eagerly seek to attack the enemy and end up in defeat, although they are in the wrong, they should not be heavily penalized. When they would duty, and fear to advance, though no loss is incurred, yet they should be punished or transferred.

Section 6. Maneuvers

Field maneuvers are the touchstone of the effectiveness of all training, and should be speciall noted. If maneuvers can be performed of all types of training mentioned above, then do them, especially those concerned with the art of guerrilla fighting, as a comprehensive training of all training. Each maneuver is like actual battle, socking reality at every point: skills, spirit, discipline, reward and punishment, must be thoroughly carried out.

After maneuvers, as after battle, there should be a study and evaluation by all who took part, of the experiences of the fight, the causes of success or failure. Finally there should be a summing up by a high officer, as a criterion for further training. If the maneuvers did not have good results, well, there should be orders for a repeated maneuvers, to arrive at a more satisfactory grasp.

Chapter 24. Demands of Guerrilla Warfare

Since guerrillas are a product arising in response to the stimulus of the existing political and economic environment, their growth has close connection with objective political, economic and geographic conditions.

At the same time both quantity and quality in the individual guerrillas

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of such things as political belief, martial skill, ability to command, etc., are basic requisites for the development of a guerrilla band. They are treated severally below:

Section 1. Demand for Men

A guerrilla band carries on total war, so that at no time, no place may the enemy be free from pressure. To carry on total war ever a large area, demands as its prime condition of wictory, a large number of mon. The number of man, judged by our nation's population of more than 470,000,000, should/more than 40 million, if recruiting is put into practice early. The superiority in manpower may be called overwhelming. But because of poor government, our vast preponderance avails nought; we are not organized, no more than a handful of sand. We cannot manifest our super-abundant manpower, so the Japanese villains can invade and murder us at will. Fortunately, while we now cannot have 40 million trained soldiers, we really do have 40 million able-bodied men, the basic olement in getting 40 million trained soldiers. If the government will actively marshal, and the people will spontaneously onlist, then in the very near future, we can muster a very large force for decisive warfare.

What sort of organization is adapted for fighting? The man in the street knows that it is the military company. Of all social organizations, the most strictly organized is the military company, which is also the most efficient, and the most united in action. For a military company has sound leadership, orderliness, clear-cut rewards and ponalties, promotion for the deserving. The psychological unity is very marked, and unity of action very great. Group-consciousness is extremely strong and selfishness does not easily show itself. Not only must an individual

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himself net be selfish, but the group strength does not permit others to be so. Therefore military discipline is not only the severest law, but also the most active morality.

The British general Fuller says: "Of all social organization and training, there is noe so efficient and progressive as the military company". At this wartime crisis, when the entire country is scattered in mind, how can we fail to organize vigorously, in preparation for a decisive war? Most of all, the people in the first occupied areas should be formed into gerrilla bands for total war.

Since our country's resources are abundant, there is no better way to organize them than in military companies; and activities of such companies call for leadership. So the government should pick carefully its leaders for organizing the people into guarrilla bands; and among the people there should be pressure from below on those who are good at fighting, to display their skill. The important thing is that a group movement most of all needs united leadership; so whether the leader is appointed from above, or pushed up from below, the success or failure of an undertaking depends chiefly on his ability.

Napoleon says: "The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman army, but by Caesar; Rome's trembling was not because of fear of the Cathaginians, but really because Hannibal." In the eastern theatre of the European war, it was the same German Eighth Army under Prittwitz, that could not withstand the Russian troops, and considered retreat, which under Rindenburg Not only stoped the enemy but also destroyed him. Truly in war movements there must be united action, and for executing it there must be an outstanding leader. The people of the entire nation need to be formed into guerrilla bands, and the activities of each band need to be coordinated within itself,

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and those of all the bands as a whole, so as to obey absolutely the united direction of the supreme command.

Each guervilla leader, in picking, using, and transferring his endres, should fit the assignment to the man, to get maximum use of talents. In case of knowledge, bravery, whime, and stupidity, the long points should be considered for missions, the short points an occasion for warning. The deaf are good at seeing, the blind at hearing; so no one in the world is without use. So in employing men, let there be no discarding or misuse of talent. No matter whether one has been a robber or a prostitute, if one can resist in the war, one is a national rempart, a racial horo, and should used to advantage. The brave and educated should be given special consideration, and promoted rapidly, and bound by ties of favor and confidence, to keep them on our side, and not lose them to the enemy. This is a time honored practice and should be used after as a strategem in guerrilla success.

To know men and use them well is a pre-requisite in employing talent. If they are not thoroughly known, the use of them may be unsatisfactory. So it is very important for a commander to know his men and how to use them. A guerrilla leader must be a man of integrity, without prejudice or personal feeling affecting that. He should constantly observe the abilities of his cadres, using them fittingly; never saying that slaves are easy to use while telented men are hard to superintend, discarding the latter and holding on to the former. Not only when beginning operations is talent necessary; but also for maintenance without dishonor, slave work is not enough the proverb says: "In times of enarchy, stress talent; in time of peace, stress character". Just now we are in a people's war of Liberation, with our territory invaded and disorder on every hand; in the CURTIDENTIAL

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developing of guerrilla warfare, we must by no means prize the slave complex and east aside the hero spirit.

So the guerrilla leader must use his men sensibly according to their talents, so everyone will be pleased and united, for this is necessary for spreading the spirit of attack; and there must always be brave decisive action, to overcome inherent lacks of material. Especially when operations are not going well, must the leader have an unbeatable spirit, full of daring and sacrifice in the line of duty, personally leading and directing his men, to remedy the situation. He himself must never retreat, or let his men's morale falter. Let him know that under a strong general there are no weak soldiers; the commander must take the lead.

The commander is the heart of a guerrilla band, and has much influence. So he must sympathize with the band's hardships, keeping in touch with them, always thinking of their welfare. Sharing joys and griefs, safety and danger, personally experiencing all, he is an example of group ties. In military command and political work, he must import this spirit of unity to his men. Though luck is pad, though down to the last private, they must yet stick together; and when the fragments are re-united, he must appear as soon as he hears the news.

men maintain close relations with the people. The guerrillas' purpose will be accepted gratefully by the people, and their movements will be supported; and all their activities will be what the people need. Thus our present purpose to recover lost territory is what the entire nation wants; especially is it an urgent need for our compatriots in the occupied regions to resist the enemy's raping and plundering. This is the favorable political atmosphere in which our guerrillas operate; it is also the most

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acceptable pre-requisite for guerrilla growth.

People who live in the area of guerrilla operations, when oppressed by the enemy, suffer most and bear the most hatred for him; they are also the most alort, and the most ready to seek a way out. They have not only an anti-enemy spirit, but also the boldness for armed resistance. If it can be really thus, though the enemy oppress to their utmost yet their political structures will waver at the foundations, and be easily wrocked. When peacants balk on taxes, workers strike, merchants shut up shop, students parado, etc., those are the social conditions under which guerrills bands grow, and get the most results.

But there are times when such social conditions are lacking. Then push the forming of a central guerrilla core and arge it among the people, and show the utmost strength in struggle. First fortify the people's thinking so their hearts will not die, and arouse their sympathy, destroying all the enemy's pupper set-ups and political structures. For whether the conditions are present or absent, a guerrilla band can always be started. In the former case, environmental conditions precede, and then the growth comes; in the latter case, government initiative comes first, then the growth. The times can create the great man, and the great man can also create the times.

Also, guerrilla bands on a national scale must be sure to have a political faith, and to have it as a basic conviction, to rally the nation to its support. Thus the cry of Yoh Wu-mu [Yoh Fei, 1.103-1.14]. A.D.7 "Give us back our land", and that of the Russian revolution, "Welfare of peasants and workers", although held in common by societies, sects, etc. with superstitious and narrow views, were a center for uniting the

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masses. So a political faith is really a primary problem for organizing the people and for starting guerrilla bands.

Ludendorff says: "The unity of the apirit of a nation is the foundation for total war". Therefore spiritual unity is the greatest need for arousing a people. Since in the occupied regions the people have lost the protection of government, and fear of annihilation by the enemy has grawed at them for a long time, their spirits are much depressed. To keep up their morale, over a wide stretch of country, guerrillas are necessary; guerrillas may help in the following ways:

- 1. Arouse national consciousness on the part of the populace, raising their political awareness, to love liberty; inflame their hatred for the Japanese villains, famning their enthusiasm for resistance, to endure hardship, to support a death-struggle, and to maintain the highest confidence in our final victory.
- 2. Take away the people's griefs, improve their living conditions. For instance, confiscate the land and property of traitors, dividing this among poor peasants; in occupied areas, urge the people to refuse taxes and rent and attack bullies and bad squires who are willing to be shamelessly docile; and relieve the unemployed.
- 3. The main band of guorrillas should take the lead in friendly relations with the people, never taking lightly even a blade of grass or stick of wood from thom; paying the right price for goods, without any compulsion.
- 4. Organize people's guerrillas, to undertake directly all sorts of war tasks. People's guerrillas need not be limited to such tasks, but used for any grouping and activity suited to the needs of the resistance



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war. To sum up: the negative aim is not to let the people be used by the enemy; the positive, to get them into guerrilla warfare.

Section 2. Geographic Demands.

The geographic environment has a close bearing on the growth of guerrillas. For the characteristic of people's guerrillas needs a wide space in which to manifest its driving power; and complex difficult terrain shields their activities. Really the size of the national domain is the most practical reason why it cannot be subdued.

The ever-victorious Repoleon was defeated by imperialist Russia, because he strained his armies to make distant conquest of a huge land; the blockade of Soviet Russia by critain, France, Japan and the US failed in the end, because dustian territory was too large. In the first attack, european war, Belgium was an important bastion, but fell at the first attack, because its domain was too small, and there was no room to maneuver. Of late, Gzechoslovakia and Austria, strong in men and arms, fell without a struggle; the chief cause was again, the smallness of the area.

Military tactics says: "An army going a hundred <u>li</u> embarrasses a general". If he wants to conquer a large territory, his men must be far flung, which means more points of danger, longer lines, no chance for quick decision, hanging a long time, wearing out his troops with no result.

Now we should thank our glorious forefathers for bequeathing to us such a big land, 4,300,000 square miles in area, full of dangers of all sorts: targled streams in the southeast, rugged hills in the southwest, vast forests in the northeast, barren plains and deserts in the northwest, all the best sort of bases for guerrilla activities. We should actively stir up guerrillas to keep our glorious heritage and ancestral graves from being downtrodden by the enemy!

As to terrain, that which can best hide or protect guerrilla movements are hills which obstruct advance, stretches where population is sparse, long steep ravines, broad forests, losss plains, paddies where streams cross, reed marshes, or unde regrowth or tall stands of crops. In a word, all tangled, complex, dangerous, difficult places are profitable terrain for guerrilla expansion. In presently occupied areas, these adventageous types of ground are to be seen; government and people should quickly set up guerrilla bases, to spread this type of warfare.

During the Russian revolution, a large part of themational territory was lost, but this lost territory was all large cities along the trunk lines of travel; except for such lines and points, all was filled with swarms of guerrillas. They would spring up everywhere causing havoc, and the Red Army attained final victory. So the topographic demands of guorrillas are closely related to communications.

Movements of mechanized troops are at ports, and on railways and highways. Remember how the Japanese troops all used the ports of Tientsin and Shanghai as debarking bases. Most to be regretted was that highways built with no eye to military use were solely utilized by the enemy for penetration to the interior. The Shanghai-woosung area was lost because the enemy used the Socchow-Kashing highway to threaten it; Ilsu-chou city was lost, because the enemy used the highways in north Anhwei to go around it.

Since the war of resistance began, penetration by the enemy has been greatly helped by our communication facilities. Now, on their advance line, roads are few, and railways almost non-existent, so their progress is slowed. The enemy's advantage is our detriment; but a battle area which is wide and where travel is difficult is just the area to be defended by

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poorly-armed troops, and this is the best terrain for guerrilla movements. However, it is not that travel routes and cities do not need guerrillas, but that skills and opportunities have to be provided and waited for.

By new the villainous enemy has occupied all the important cities along our scaboard, intending a lengthy occupation. Fortunately our communications have not developed far, nor our economy been centralized; so the enemy cannot profit immediately from the occupation. Hence at this time the guerrillas should rapidly expand, make bases in favorable terrain, for advance into the cities. Though they cannot recapture the cities, yet they must encourage the inhabitants, and in this way pressure on the countryside may be relieved. For the enemy, in order to hold the cities he has captured, cannot scatter and use up his main forces and thus reduce his strength for attack.

When guarrillas have grown everywhere and are strong, they should surround and slip into the cities, preventing the enemy from holding the cities, as they want to. But when guarrilla action demands road-blocks, those should be limited to the starting point and the last base to be left.

while the growth of guerrilla bands should mostly be in isolated and casily blocked off regions, nevertheless economic conditions there have an important bearing on such growth. For all supply of guerrilla needs, even the simplest, such as clothing, minimum pay, necessary ammunition, etc. cannot be compared with that of regulars, who have continuous supply from the rear. Guerrilla mobility militates against normal supply and under their changing precarious circumstances, they depend the more on bases.

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the guerrillas have abundant supply or not. Will they divide, or not have enough for themselves? That is the question. While the guerrillas themselves should not as a rule exact contributions, which should be given cheerfully yet at least the guerrillas can avoid arousing opposition. If the place where the guerrillas must operate is poor land and the economy weak, although the people are eager for resistance but indigent, then the following plans may be adopted:

- 1. Let local guerrillas who are not in actual fighting or training devote themselves to production.
 - 2. Take guerrillas in a poor district to a rich district, to forage.
- 3. Do not over-expand any one guerrilla unit, lest adequate supply not be found.
- 4. There military tactics are needed, and the district is poor, secretly set up guerrilla bases, where arms, food, and health supplies may be cached.

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Section 3. Demand for Skills

backward country is compelled to adopt, and it makes up for material inadequacy by entremely sacrifical power of spirit. But never must material atmempth be case aside through exclusive reliance on the power of sacrifice. Wind indeed affects matter; but matter also affects mind. With plenty of material equipment, so on one dared oppose, of course puerfills morals is high; no matter how scared a man is, if he is sitting in a tank, attacking men whose only meanons are riflus, he has more courage.

Truly scientific skill, the crystallization of cultural advance, is the mainstay of production and righting, and the creiterion of the survival of the rittest. A man's labor does not cultivate as much as a mou in 10 days; a power-plow will do 500 mou in one day. A man's labor grinding flour, will do only a few pecks in a day; machinery will do several tens of thousands. Power coats and vehicles are wastly supprior to those moved by human muscles; this is the more true of simplenes and electric communications.

If guerrillas are satisfied with swords and rifles, not seeking more military skill, they will neither have strength to near the tragedy of sacrifice nor the brunt of a decisive battle. Hence when the guerrillas grow to be a large force they should the more be highly qualified; this is the demand for confidence in military skill.

Guerrilla warfare has no place in the military science of advance and invasion. For instance, the Soviet instructions for field warfare, though ranked as specific orders, were before long expunsed again; for

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the armod peasants and laborers had soon become the competent Red army. Fighting the directions, in the time of Lemin and Trotzky, were at first, essentially, for resistance by attrition, with chief emphasis on widespread guerrilla warfare; recently, as Joviet soldiering has improved side by side with industrial growth, there has been real attempth for attack, and war of movement, columns, and killing. If war is really a contest between the his heat forms of human culture, then anderiority in skills is backwardness in civilization; and inferiority in skill means trading the sacrifice of men for space and time, to join improvement in skills and growth in culture.

while pascrillas use homen strength for whoming extraordinary victories, it is more pertinent to gain space and time for improvement in skills. Unless here is real material strength, what is gained is yet limited. Ludendorff says: "superior strategy must be sustained by real strength in tactics". Total strength in tactics can create superior strategy; but superior strategy cannot create real strength in tactics. A succession of small victories may become a big one; if one is defeated everywhere, although the possibility of victory is present, yet soon the ond is tefeat.

This may be proved by the nationalist strategy since the war began. At first, whenever we had marked superiority, as in the Hsin-k'ou campaign in North Shansi, the enemy penetrated deeply, was surrounded in a trap; but because of his better tactical strength in cannon and planes, the final result was that our superior strategy came to naught; that is, our tactical strength was inadequate.

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In military science, tactical strength means ability for movement, for seizure, for defense; or in broad terms, strength of forces /Boldiers/. In other words, it is the real strength consisting in weapons, communications, derenses, etc., made possible by salitary skills. Only when accompanied by the above-named real atrenaths, can elever atrategy be supported. The establishing of this tactical principle assumes equality of soldiers and compone, on the two uldes.

We must realize that wedern warfare is already different from that of the past. Final victory by sucrrillas, seeing it is not attangule merely by popular revolt in a screaming crowler, also is not to be gained colely by regulars who are bulky, hard to maneuver, with complex rear service, lacking in spontaneous spirit of attack.

Note how complete is enemy air search and observation; how strong their forticiations; how strict their precautions; their might lighting; their array of spice and traitors; their mechanization of movement; their possible future cruel terror and guarding at passes, using electric or poison-gas blockade. If you wish to draw near for a sudden reid, it is exceedingly difficult especially for a crowd of plain people, or oldtype troops.

So to be modern guerrillas, whether regular troops or armed populace, modern guerrilla tactics must be provided. Manimum requirements should be automatic firearms and their use; explosives and flame-throwers and their employment; use and prevention or chemical poisoning; transport and signalling; spies; scouts; propaganda; organization; and adaptation to weather, terrain, and popular customs; all of which need special skills.

Since the fate of the nation's survival rests upon the guerrillas in modern China they should not look lightly on the demand for skills. CONFIDENTIA

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Colonel Lawrence speaking of sucrilla warfare says it is really pure science. Each sucrilla unit, in its own sphere of action, must be like a naval craft on the ocean, with the skill and strength for self-custenance and free attack. It must be sufe to maintain liaison with all other craft, with unified command, to get the effects of working together as one.

So guerrillas should earnestly promote military skills for full realization, provide conditions for fine maneuverability, ability for defense added to firepower for attack; only thus can modern puerrilla marfare got its best results.

while Lawrence's words may have some further meaning, namely that of Britain fighting a guerrilla war on foreign soal, he was magnifying self-support. More there widespread guerrilla activity within her own borders, the standars of this demand might have been lowered. But the main body, and the army guerrillas, must still so by it as a norm or criterion.

Our brave men have been resisting for nearly a year. The Japanese now know that their strategy of "quick fight, quick decision" cannot be realized, so they go further with their dream of "maintain war by war". For instance, in the occupied areas they are conscripting our men, etc., in order to add to their own military force by taking away our resources, lessening the burden on their country and mitigating domestic quarrels and the rise of revolutionary action.

At this time our country has only one effective recourse, namely to utilize our broad land to organize the populace and sharpen their military skill. Especially in the occupied areas we should press forward the people's movements, organizing people's guerrillas, to restrict

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enamy movements, putting through a seorched earth policy, so that nothing falls into enemy hants for use. Keep the enemy forever in quick fight Without quick decision; and in a bitter war where he cannot maintain war by war, use up his men and resources by attrition. Thus the war will be prolonged, and he will have no funds left with which to carry on.

The outcome of this attrition will be more difficulties for the livelihood of his people and the force of the revolution will increase. At the same time international conditions will change, with peace and justice being expanded. The enemy's dream of increasing military preparadness will experience a rude threat. Then the enemy's milituristic ruling class, even if not dragged by us into a defeat by the great powers, will nevertheless be overthrown b. their own people.

Guerrilla warfare is necessary tactics by an oppressed nation resisting appression. This is a fact and truth of ancient times and now, in all countries. That cannot be denied. And in guerrilla warfare there is a close connection between the people's work and the guerrilla bands. Indeed the whief strength of guerrilla warfare is in the people themselves. so hereafter both regulars and guerrillas must be united with the people for righting.

Only by rousing large numbers of people can guerrilla warfare be expanded largely; only by such expansion can we smash the enemy's plot of "maintain war by war"; only by widespread guerrilla warfare can we protect the growth of our regulars and make a decisive attack on the enemy; only by drawing on the limitless strength of our 470 million people, can we reach our aim of long-time attrition of the enemy, and attain the goal of final victory for our nation. CONFIDENTIAL.

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